Abstract
Executive pay and corporate governance issues continue to attract wide academic, media and policy attention.1 The very high salaries enjoyed by senior executives in corporations in some economies are often contrasted with the relatively low pay received by executives in other economies. The case of the USA (high CEO pay) and Japan (low CEO pay) is an obvious example. At the same time, the stark differences in the corporate governance structures between such economies is often highlighted. For instance, the governance system in the USA and UK (which stress the market for corporate control as a means of correcting managerial failure) is compared with the German and Japanese system (which stress long-term commitment). There is an implicit assumption that these alternative systems of corporate control and governance may result in quite different economic outcomes and in particular patterns of executive pay.
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Conyon, M.J., Schwalbach, J. (1999). Corporate governance, executive pay and performance in Europe. In: Carpenter, J., Yermack, D. (eds) Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value. The New York University Salomon Center Series on Financial Markets and Institutions, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_2
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