Skip to main content

The reluctant gamesperson — A comment on Baye, Kovenock and De Vries

  • Chapter
  • 782 Accesses

Abstract

My role with respect to “efficient rent-seeking”1 is an unfortunate one. Rather by accident, I discovered a new paradox in economics, something we emphatically don’t need. Various people have attempted to abolish the paradox or demonstrate that it is not very severe. My unhappy role has been pushing the discussion “Back to the Bog”.2 Although I don’t like paradoxes, I invented one and now I am defending it.

He kindly explained his position to me both in letters and in conversation. The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R > 2: Mixed strategy equiilibria and mean dissipation rates. Public Choice 81(3–4): 363–380.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Tullock, G. (1980) Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97112. College Station:Texas A&M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Tullock, G. (1980) Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97112. College Station:Texas A&M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  3. See “Games and preference”, Rationality and Society,Vol. 4, No. 1, 1992, pp. 24–32.

    Google Scholar 

  4. A general analysis of rent-seeking games, Public Choice 73 (3): 335–350, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Tullock, G. (1993) “Still somewhat muddy: A comment”. Public Choice Vol. 76 No. 4, pp. 365–370, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Op. cit. EN 4.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Ellsberg, Daniel, “Theory of the Reluctant Duelist” American Economc Review, Vol 46, pp. 909–923, 1956.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tullock, G. (2001). The reluctant gamesperson — A comment on Baye, Kovenock and De Vries. In: Lockard, A.A., Tullock, G. (eds) Efficient Rent-Seeking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_28

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_28

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4866-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-5055-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics