Abstract
We examine the equilibrium individual players’, groups’, and total effort levels expended in a contest where groups compete with one another to win a group-specific public-good prize and the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Baik, K.H. (2001). Effort Levels in Contests: The Public-Good Prize Case. In: Lockard, A.A., Tullock, G. (eds) Efficient Rent-Seeking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4866-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-5055-3
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