Abstract
Perez-Castrillo and Verdiers1 seem to have solved the bulk of the first level mathematical puzzles in my “Efficient Rent-Seeking”. There still remains the second order of puzzle mentioned in my first article, the question of which “agent” (to use their terminology) will be the one or more who buys tickets in this lottery. This, I am happy to say, is somewhat easier than the original problem, but until it is solved we can’t claim to understand the issue in general.
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Notes
A general analysis of rent-seeking games“ in Public Choice 73.3 (April 1992): 335–350.
Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (Eds.) (1980), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society ( College Station: Texas AandM University Press ), pp. 97–112.
They mention in passing the possibility that r would turn up somewhere. This seems to me to be a dubious solution to the problem, but they don’t analyze it and I will follow their example.
“Despite violation, Virginia to pay a lottery jackpot of $27 million” in The New York Times 11 March 1992; A13.
Usually with a small cost.
There is an alternative to getting out which is to go down to a low number. For example, A might go down to 1 on the theory that if B goes down to 0 you get the money at a low price and if he doesn’t he will lose only a little bit. The problem with this is, again, it’s symmetrical — the same strategy is open to both.
For my general criticism of mixed strategies, briefly summarized in the following few sentences of the text, see “Games and preference” in Rationality and Society 4.1 (January 1992): 24–32.
“Tracking the tailspin of ‘Radio Flyer’” in The New York Times (9 March 1992): 131.
For an explanation and an application to other economic problems, see my “Hawks, doves and free riders” in Kyklos,45 (1992): Fasc. 1, 25–36. German translated excerpts were published in Wirtschafts Woche (8 November 1991): 132–134.
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Tullock, G. (2001). Still somewhat muddy: A comment. In: Lockard, A.A., Tullock, G. (eds) Efficient Rent-Seeking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_20
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