Abstract
The theory of rent seeking was initiated by Tullock (1967, 1980), followed by Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) and, more recently, extended in various directions by Allard (1988); Appelbaum and Katz (1986a, b, c); Gradstein and Nitzan (1989); Hillman and Katz (1984, 1987), Hillman and Samet (1987); Hillman and Riley (1989); Katz et al. (1990); Long and Vousden (1987); Ursprung (1990) and Varian (1989). The purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective-group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent-seeking efforts.
I am very much indebted to John Hey, Arye L. Hillman, Nava Kahana and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to express my appreciation to Moshe Glazman for his help in data processing.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Nitzan, S. (2001). Collective Rent Dissipation. In: Lockard, A.A., Tullock, G. (eds) Efficient Rent-Seeking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4866-3
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