International Monetary Policy Coordination

  • Torsten Persson
  • Guido Tabellini


In a world of free trade and capital mobility, monetary policy is strongly interdependent across countries via international spillover effects on inflation and employment. These interdependencies create strategic interactions in policymaking. This chapter introduces some of the main ideas from the large literature on international monetary policy coordination which deals precisely with the strategic aspects of policymaking. This literature is extensively surveyed also in Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), Currie and Levine (1993), Ghosh and Masson (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1995).


Exchange Rate Monetary Policy Central Bank Real Exchange Rate European Central Bank 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Torsten Persson
    • 1
  • Guido Tabellini
    • 2
  1. 1.CEPRIIES, Stockholm UniversitySweden
  2. 2.CEPRIGIER, Bocconi UniversityItaly

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