Arbitrage, Incomplete Models, and Other People’s Brains

  • Robert Nau
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLB, volume 40)


Over the last 50 years, the theory of rational choice bas emerged as the dominant paradigm of quantitative research in the social and economic sciences. The idea that individuals make choices by rationally weighing values and uncertainties (or that they ought to, or at least act as if they do) is central to Bayesian methods of statistical inference and decision analysis; the theory of games of strategy; theories of competitive markets, industrial organization, and asset pricing; the theory of social choice; and a host of rational actor models in political science, sociology, law, philosophy, and management science.


Nash Equilibrium Rational Choice Standard Theory Contingent Claim Rational Choice Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Nau
    • 1
  1. 1.Fuqua School Of BusinessDuke UniversityUSA

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