Education Signalling and Uncertainty

  • Jürgen Eichberger
  • David Kelsey
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLB, volume 40)


Applying the new concept of a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium to signalling games, we show that a pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium outcome. With strategic uncertainty, signalling productivity by education may no longer be feasible.


Equilibrium Concept Signalling Game Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Education Signalling Choquet Expected Utility 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jürgen Eichberger
    • 1
  • David Kelsey
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics (FB 2)Universität des SaarlandesGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsThe University of BirminghamUK

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