Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities

  • Peter A. Hall
  • David Soskice

Abstract

Political economists have always been interested in the differences in economic and political institutions that occur across countries. Some regard these differences as deviations from ‘best practice’ that will dissolve as nations catch up to a technological or organizational leader. Others see them as the distillation of more durable historical choices for a specific kind of society, since economic institutions condition levels of social protection, the distribution of income, and the availability of collective goods — features of the social solidarity of a nation. In each case, comparative political economy revolves around the conceptual frameworks used to understand institutional variation across nations.

Keywords

Political Economy Market Economy Trade Union Strategic Interaction National Innovation System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter A. Hall
  • David Soskice

There are no affiliations available

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