Probabilities in the Courtroom: An Evaluation of the Objections and Policies



This quotation is notable both for its wisdom and its issuance from a dissenting opinion. We live in a probabilistic world. There are few guarantees, and only rarely does the search for truth end with a certain answer. More often, the truths we discover are generalizations, statements that predict outcomes in an implicitly probabilistic fashion.


Prob Ability Fact Finder Mock Juror Posterior Odds Appellate Court 
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