Cost Recovery and Short-Run Efficiency

  • Claude Crampes
Chapter

Abstract

When designing a tariff for the transport of electricity, the main difficulty is that the transport industry apparently incurs high fixed costs and no real variable cost. In effect, when the infrastructure is installed and when the operators are at their workplace, the only input which is necessary to deliver electricity at a given withdrawal node is electricity at some injection node since electricity is flowing by itself. Consequently, at first sight the problem is just to allocate fixed costs, mainly infrastructure maintenance costs, wages and financial charges, among the different types of users of the grid.

Keywords

Marginal Cost Optimal Allocation Electricity Network Transport Infrastructure Cost Recovery 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claude Crampes
    • 1
  1. 1.Gremaq and IdeiUniversity of ToulouseFrance

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