Patents as Structural Capital — Towards Legal Constructionism

  • Ulf Petrusson


This paper analyses the intellectual property and intellectual property right concepts and their interaction with the transformation of industrial society. Its main aim is to increase the understanding of how the concept of patent and the concepts which underlie the Patent Institute are integrated with technological and industrial development. This aim involves not only a questioning of the intellectual property concepts within jurisprudence, but also a more radical questioning of concepts of law and how law interacts with an increasingly knowledge-oriented economic system. A marked feature of the analysis is an endeavor to capture the complexities of intellectual property as a phenomenon and to contribute to a constructionistic understanding of law.


Intellectual Property Structural Capital Favored Position Patent Office Patentable Invention 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulf Petrusson
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Intellectual Property StudiesChalmers University of TechnologyGöteborgSweden
  2. 2.School of LawGöteborg UniversityGöteborgSweden

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