Abstract
The framework of weighted majority games is considered. Any player is characterized by a program, i.e., a set of projects that he promotes and a set of projects that he opposes. The coalitions among the players are determined by the attempts to realize their programs. Some power indices which consider a model of bargaining similar to that of the Shapley-Shubik index are proposed. An application to the Italian political situation is presented.
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Ricci, G., Greco, S., Vinci, R. (2002). Government and Opposition Weighted Majority Games: An Analysis of the Italian Political Situation. In: Zaccour, G. (eds) Decision & Control in Management Science. Advances in Computational Management Science, vol 4. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3561-1_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3561-1_21
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