Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games
This paper addresses the problem whether a cooperative agreement, made at the start of a game, can be sustained over time. The players can reopen negotiations or reconsider their strategies at any instant of time during the play of the game. Research in differential games has addressed the question of individual rationality over time under headings such as time consistency, dynamic stability, agreeability, or acceptability, and often in an applied context. The question is whether a bargained solution, satisfying individual rationality at the start of the game, will remain individually rational as the state vector evolves over time. The paper collects various research works on intertemporal individual rationality.
KeywordsIndividual Rationality Cooperative Game Differential Game Equilibrium Strategy Time Consistency
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