Abstract
In Nielsen, 1999 and in Chapter 7 it is shown that, in a strategic investment new market model, competition by an identical firm precipitates investment. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the same issue, namely the effect of introducing another firm on the original firm’s investment decision, in an asymmetric setting. We introduce asymmetry by letting the firms have different investment costs, but the methods and results should be extendable to other types of asymmetry as well.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Huisman, K.J.M. (2001). One New Technology and Asymmetric Firms. In: Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Options Approach. Theory and Decision Library, vol 28. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3423-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3423-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4911-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3423-2
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