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Information in the Theory of Organizations

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Abstract

Since the beginning of the 1970s, the economic theory of organisations has made rapid progress, and the intuitions of Coase and Simon, which had, so to speak, remained in the collective unconscious mind of our science, were made explicit and integrated in the analytical corpus thanks to advances in the economics of information. The aim of this chapter is to throw some light on the reasons why the theory of organisations has become in great part a theory of information.

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Petit, P. (2001). Information in the Theory of Organizations. In: Petit, P. (eds) Economics and Information. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3367-9_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3367-9_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4925-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3367-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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