Structure and Role of Information and Beliefs in Game Theory

  • Pascal Petit
Chapter

Abstract

In economic theory, especially in competitive equilibrium, an agent adapts his behaviour to an environment considered as exogenous, essentially the price system and some physical factors. In game theory, eventually applied to imperfect competition, a player faces a strategic environment formed of other players, whose actions have interrelated consequences with his own moves. In both cases, the perception by an actor of his environment was successively taken into account by means of information about his past, expectations about his future and beliefs about its structure. Hence, besides the preferences of the individual classically considered, his beliefs are introduced as another kind of mental states, and together are the cornerstones of his mental deliberation.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Common Knowledge Belief Revision Accessibility Relation Belief Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pascal Petit
    • 1
  1. 1.ParisFrance

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