Abstract
This note considers some of the issues involved in the design and conduct of monetary policy by an independent monetary authority. We bring complementary perspectives to this joint venture. One of us served on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England from its inception in June 1997 until June 2000. The other was a member of the Shadow Monetary Policy Committee and also of the ‘Maude Commission’, set up in 1999 by the then Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Rt. Hon. Francis Maude MP,”... to conduct an investigation into the workings, advantages and deficiencies of the current monetary policy regime....”1
The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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References
Bank of England Commission (2000), Final Report, Published by the Conservative Party, London.
Barro, R. and D. Gordon (1983), A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, Journal of Political Economy 91, 589–610.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Buiter, W.H., Sibert, A.C. (2001). Designing a Monetary Authority. In: Santomero, A.M., Viotti, S., Vredin, A. (eds) Challenges for Central Banking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3306-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3306-8_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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