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Variational Inequality Models of Restructured Electricity Systems

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Complementarity: Applications, Algorithms and Extensions

Part of the book series: Applied Optimization ((APOP,volume 50))

Abstract

Electricity systems are being restructured throughout the world (see [18, 34] for general overviews of the phenomenon). The literature on the subject is now plentiful; it is directed to both academic and professional audiences. It embraces texts on systems descriptions, antitrust and regulatory cases, as well as economic or computational models. Some publications like the Electricity Journal appear to be almost entirely devoted to the various issues generated by the reorganization of the electricity industry. This explosion of interest is due to a major feature of electricity restructuring: the overall process appears to be unusually difficult (see [31] for a discussion of the origins of these difficulties). As a result different paradigms have been proposed and no two systems, even when inspired by the same principles, are identical. Experience with existing systems is now growing but many questions remain. This diversity of paradigms and situations, with no clear cut indication of what is right and wrong, is at the origin of this explosion of interest.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ELECTRABEL, R&D Energy Markets, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Olivier Daxhelet

  2. CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Yves Smeers

Authors
  1. Olivier Daxhelet
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  2. Yves Smeers
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Sciences Department, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, USA

    Michael C. Ferris  & Olvi L. Mangasarian  & 

  2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA

    Jong-Shi Pang

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Daxhelet, O., Smeers, Y. (2001). Variational Inequality Models of Restructured Electricity Systems. In: Ferris, M.C., Mangasarian, O.L., Pang, JS. (eds) Complementarity: Applications, Algorithms and Extensions. Applied Optimization, vol 50. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3279-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3279-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4847-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3279-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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