Variational Inequality Models of Restructured Electricity Systems

  • Olivier Daxhelet
  • Yves Smeers
Part of the Applied Optimization book series (APOP, volume 50)


Electricity systems are being restructured throughout the world (see [18, 34] for general overviews of the phenomenon). The literature on the subject is now plentiful; it is directed to both academic and professional audiences. It embraces texts on systems descriptions, antitrust and regulatory cases, as well as economic or computational models. Some publications like the Electricity Journal appear to be almost entirely devoted to the various issues generated by the reorganization of the electricity industry. This explosion of interest is due to a major feature of electricity restructuring: the overall process appears to be unusually difficult (see [31] for a discussion of the origins of these difficulties). As a result different paradigms have been proposed and no two systems, even when inspired by the same principles, are identical. Experience with existing systems is now growing but many questions remain. This diversity of paradigms and situations, with no clear cut indication of what is right and wrong, is at the origin of this explosion of interest.


Variational Inequality Market Power Problem Versus Infrastructure Cost Bilateral Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier Daxhelet
    • 1
  • Yves Smeers
    • 2
  1. 1.ELECTRABELR&D Energy MarketsLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium
  2. 2.COREUniversité catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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