Game Theory pp 469-532 | Cite as

Countably Many Players: The Shapley Value

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 25)


The topic of large games has been dealt with in the previous chapters by means of a replication procedure. This means that games or markets increase by replicating a fixed number of types of players and by considering the limiting behavior of solution concepts like the core, the Shapley value, or the Walrasian equilibrium.


Invariant Measure Solution Concept Marginal Contribution Vote Power Walrasian Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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