Game Theory pp 429-468 | Cite as

Replica Market Games

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 25)


This chapter is dealing with convergence theorems concerning the core, the competitive equilibrium and the Shapley value, thus we are mainly concerned with market games, more precisely TU-market games or side payment market games. The convergence or “equivalence” of core and equilibrium is perhaps not so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see Hildenbrand [HDB74], Mas-Colell [MCL85], and others. However, we want to shortly touch some techniques and methods which are employed to obtain this kind of theorems. In particular we want to discuss the behavior of the Shapley value.


Utility Function Equal Treatment Grand Coalition Equilibrium Payoff Market Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BielefeldGermany

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