Abstract
This chapter is dealing with convergence theorems concerning the core, the competitive equilibrium and the Shapley value, thus we are mainly concerned with market games, more precisely TU-market games or side payment market games. The convergence or “equivalence” of core and equilibrium is perhaps not so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see Hildenbrand [HDB74], Mas-Colell [MCL85], and others. However, we want to shortly touch some techniques and methods which are employed to obtain this kind of theorems. In particular we want to discuss the behavior of the Shapley value.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Rosenmüller, J. (2000). Replica Market Games. In: Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 25. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5114-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3212-2
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