This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand.
We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.
Information Disclosure Patent System Sequential Game Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Rand Journal
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Bagwell, K., Ramey, G. (1990). — “Advertising and Pricing to Deter or Accomodate Entry when Demand is Unknown”, IJIO, 81, pp. 93–113.Google Scholar
van Dijk, T. (1995). — “Innovation Incentives Through Third Degree Price Discrimination in a Model of Patent Breadth”, Economic letters, 47, pp. 431–435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1986). — “Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: an Introduction and Overview”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. Schmalensee et R. Willig.Google Scholar
Gallini, N. (1991). — “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation”, Rand Journal of Economics, 23, pp. 52–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, R., Shapiro, C. (1990). — “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth”, Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 106–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horstmann, I., MacDonald, G. M., Slivinski, A. (1985). — “Patent as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (maybe) not to Patent”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 837–858.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klemperer, P. (1990). — “How Broad should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?”, Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 113–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lanjouw, J., Pakes, A., Putnam, J. (1996). — “How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data”, Working paper 5741.
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G. (1987). — “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development”, Brookings papers on economic activity, 3, pp. 783–831.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macho-Stadler, I., Pérez-Castrillo, D. (1991). — “Contrats de licences et asymétrie d’information”, Annales d’Economie et Statistique, 24, pp. 189–208.Google Scholar
Pakes, A. (1985). — “On Patent, R&D and the Stock Market Rate of Return”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 390–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schankerman, M., Pakes, A.(1985). — “Valeur et Obsolescence des brevets”, Revue Economique, 36, pp. 917–941.Google Scholar
Scotchmer, S., Green, J. (1990). — “Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law”, RAND Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 131–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warshofsky, F. (1994). — The Patent Wars. The battle to own the world’s technology, John Wiley, Sons, Inc., New York.Google Scholar