Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Expanding Competition in Regulated Industries pp 97–115Cite as

Dynamic Competition and Monopoly Regulation

  • Chapter

  • 87 Accesses

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 37))

Abstract

New technologies produce familiar challenges for regulators assessing the causes and consequences of market power. Competition is now possible in most traditional regulated utility industries, which leaves regulators facing many questions previously the province of antitrust experts. In natural gas, telecommunications, and even electricity, regulators and legislators find it increasingly necessary to identify competitors, assess the extent of competition, and craft pro-competitive policies.

The authors would like to thank Michael Crew, Shelby Hunt, Stan Liebowitz, Steve Margolis, and discussants and participants at the May 2000 Research Seminar for helpful comments and suggestions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Andrews, Kenneth. 1980. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Richard D. Irwin, Inc. Arthur, W. Brian. 1990. “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy.” Scientific American (February).

    Google Scholar 

  • AT & T. 1999. Proxy Statement/Prospectus on the Merger of AT & T and TCI (Jan. 8). AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board. 1999. 119 S.Ct. 721.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, William J., and Janusz Ordover. 1992. “Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static Inefficiencies?” In Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness edited by T. Jorde and D. Teece, New York: Oxford: 82–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell-Atlantic-GTE. 1999. “Public Interest Statement.” In the Matter of GTE and Bell Atlantic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandler, Alfred. 1962. Strategy and Structure. Boston: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conner, Kathleen. 1991. “A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?” Journal of Management 17: 121–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crandall, Robert W. 1991. After the Breakup. Washington: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crandall, Robert W. 2000. Who Pays for Telephone Service? Washington: Brookings. Crandall, Robert W. and Jerry Eilig. 1996. Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice. Fairfax, VA: Center for Market Processes.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crandall, Robert W., and Leonard Waverman. 1996. Talk Is Cheap. Washington: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cyert, R. M., and J. G. March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dierickx, Ingemar, and Karel Cool. 1989. “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage,” Management Science 35: 1504–1511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eilig, Jerry. 2000. “Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare: The Role of Dynamic Efficiency,” unpublished manuscript, Mercatus Center, George Mason University..

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig, Jerry. 2001. Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig, Jerry; Jeff Kaufman; and Thomas Rustici. 1995. “When Do Sunk Costs Prevent Entry? The Case of Gas Pipelines,” manuscript, George Mason University (March 17). Federal Communications Commission.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig,Jerry.1997a.In Re Pacific Telesis and SBC Communications (January 31).

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig,Jerry.1997b.In the Applications of NYNEX and Bell Atlantic (August 14).

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig,Jerry.1998.Application of Bellsouth Corp. for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, Memorandum Opinion and Order. CC Docket No. 98–121 (October 13 ).

    Google Scholar 

  • Eilig,Jerry.1999.Broadband Report 1999. CC Docket No. 98–146 (January 28).

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedlaender, Ann F. 1969. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation. Washington: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, Jerry A. 1997. “Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeonomics: 1–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, Friedrich A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35: 519–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayek,Friedrich A.1978.“Competition as a Discovery Procedure.” In New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics,Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofer, C.W., and D. Schendel. 1978. Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, Shelby D. 2000. A General Theory of Competition. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, Shelby D. 1985. “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility.” American Economic Review 75: 424–440.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, Shelby D. 1994. “Systems Competition and Network Effects.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 100–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, Israel M. 1985. Discovery and the Capitalist Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, Israel M. 1997. `Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach.“ Journal of Economic Literature 35: 65–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Langlois, Richard. 2001. “Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities: Towards a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach,” In Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues Edited by Jerry Ellig, New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, R.C. 1978. “Allocation in Surface Freight Transportation: Does Rate Regulation Matter?” Bell Journal of Economics 9: 18–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, Stan, and Stephen E. Margolis. 1990. “The Fable of the Keys.” Journal of Law and Economics 33: 1–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, Stan, and Stephen E. Margolis. 1995. “Path Dependence, Lock-In and History.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11: 205–226

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebowitz, Stan, and Stephen E. Margolis. 2001. “Network Effects and the Microsoft Case,” In Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues Edited by Jerry Eilig, New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, Thomas G. 1975. “Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation.” In Promoting Competition in Regulated Industries, edited by Almarin Phillips, Washington: Brookings.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, Milton L. Jr. 1997. Universal Service. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, Richard R. 1981. “Assessing Private Enterprise: An Exegesis of Tangled Doctrine.” Bell Journal of Economics 12:1 (Spring): 93–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Penrose, Edith. 1990. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pleatsikas, Christopher, and David J. Teece. 2001. “New Indicia for Antitrust Analysis in Markets Experiencing Rapid Innovation.” In Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues, edited by Jerry Ellig, New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reback, Gary, Susan Creighton, David Killam and Neil Nathanson, with assistance from Garth Saloner and W. Brian Arthur. Technological, Economic and Legal Perspectives Regarding Microsoft’s Business Strategy in Light of the Proposed Acquisition of Intuit, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rumelt, Richard. 1984. “Toward a Strategic Theory of the Firm.” In Competitive Strategy Management, edited by R. B. Lamb, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rumelt, Richard. 1987. “Theory, Strategy, and Entrepreneurship,” In David Teece, ed., The Competitive Challenge. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

    Google Scholar 

  • SBC-Ameritech. 1999. “Description of the Transaction, Public Interest Showing, and Related Demonstrations” (July 28).

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teece, David. 1982. “Toward an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7: 39–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Winston, C. 1998. “U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12:3 (Summer): 89–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winston, C. 1993. “Economic Deregulation: Day of Reckoning for Microeconomists.” Journal of Economic Literature 31 (September): 1263–1289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, Sidney G. 1964. “Economic `Natural Selection’ and the Theory of the Firm.” Yale Economic Essays 4: 225–272.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mercatus Center, George Mason University, USA

    Jerry Ellig & Daniel Lin

Authors
  1. Jerry Ellig
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Daniel Lin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Michael A. Crew

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ellig, J., Lin, D. (2000). Dynamic Competition and Monopoly Regulation. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Expanding Competition in Regulated Industries. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 37. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3192-7_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3192-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5006-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3192-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation