The “Contract and Agency State” as a Multiple Principal-Agent Problem

  • Elke Löffler
Chapter

Abstract

According to a quantitative analysis of OECD surveys on public management developments, various forms of organizational decentralization are the predominant types of modernization initiative to be found in OECD member countries (Naschold, 1995:42f.). This trend is rooted in the liberal belief that decentralized forms of political and administrative decision making are per se superior to centralized public sector management.

Keywords

Agency State Asymmetrical Information Agency Cost Service Unit Contract Relationship 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998

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  • Elke Löffler

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