Fluctuating Benefits and Collective Action

  • Bernardo A. Huberman
Part of the Advances in Computational Economics book series (AICE, volume 6)

Abstract

We show that when individuals confronted with a social dilemma contribute to the common good with an effort that fluctuates in time, they can make the group generate an average utility that actually decreases in time. This paradoxical behavior takes place in spite of the fact that typically individuals are found to be contributing at any given time. This novel phenomenon, which we verified in a number of computer experiments, is the result of an intermittency effect, whereby unlikely bursts of defection determine the average behavior of the group. Besides providing a dynamical theory for the lognormal distribution found in some sociological data, these results show that the typical behavior of individuals comprising a group can be inconsistent with its average properties.

Keywords

Collective Action Stochastic Differential Equation Common Good Linear Stability Analysis Constraint Satisfaction Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bernardo A. Huberman

There are no affiliations available

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