Abstract
We consider solutions of NTU cooperative games defined with help of an excess function — the ε-core, the prenucleolus, the prekernel. It is shown that both the prenucleolus and the prekernel don’t possess the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for all excess functions satisfying the Kalai’s (Kalai (1978)) conditions. The ε-core may possess these properties or not in dependence on excess functions. Axiomatic characterizations of the ε-core for arbitrary fixed ε and of the collection of ε-cores for all ε and for a particular excess function are given.
The research for this paper was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (project 95–01–00118) and by the ACE091-R02 project grant from the European Community.
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References
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Yanovskaya, E. (1997). Consistency Properties of the Nontransferable Cooperative Game Solutions. In: Parthasarathy, T., Dutta, B., Potters, J.A.M., Raghavan, T.E.S., Ray, D., Sen, A. (eds) Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research. Theory and Decision Library, vol 18. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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