The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) Value for TU-Games
The paper introduces a new solution concept for transferable utility games called the Egalitarian Non-Pairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) value. This solution arises from the egalitarian division of the surplus of the overall profits after each participant is conceded to get his pairwise-averaged contribution. Four interpretations of the ENPAC-value are presented. The second part of the paper provides sufficient conditions on the transferable utility game to guarantee that the ENPAC-value coincides with the well-known solution called prenucleolus. The main conditions require that the largest excesses at the ENPAC-value are attained at the (n — 2)-person coalitions, whereas the excesses of (n — 2)-person coalitions at the ENPAC-value do not differ.
KeywordsCooperative Game Large Excess Solution Concept Grand Coalition Payoff Vector
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