Nonlinear Self Dual Solutions for TU-Games

  • Peter Sudhölter
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 18)


For cooperative transferable utility games solution concepts are presented which resemble the core-like solution concepts prenucleolus and prekernei These modified solutions take into account both, the ‘power’, i.e. the worth, and the ‘blocking power’ of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition, in a totally symmetric way. As a direct consequence of the corresponding definitions they are self dual, i.e. the solutions of the game and its dual coincide. Sudhælter’s recent results on the modified nucleolus are surveyed. Moreover, an axiomatization of the modified kernel is presented.


Cooperative Game Solution Concept Grand Coalition Assignment Game Maximal Excess 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Sudhölter
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematical EconomicsUniversity of BielefeldBielefeldGermany

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