Abstract
So far we have studied the procedural aspects of social choice processes. We discussed aggregation procedures — social choice rules — in general and packages of properties these aggregation procedures may satisfy. We have also studied particular aggregation procedures like the system of majority decision. In this chapter social choice processes are studied from another perspective. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the essence of politics is winning. Winning or losing — to enforce a social choice that is in accordance with one’s preference in some degree or to be forced to accept a social choice that does not accord at all with one’s preference — will now be at the center of our attention. We are now primarily interested in the formation of winning coalitions that can enforce a social choice and therefore the procedural aspects are left aside.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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van Deemen, M.A. (1997). Coalition Formation in Simple Games. In: Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Theory and Decision Library, vol 19. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4781-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-2578-0
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