Coalition Formation in Simple Games

  • M. A. van Deemen
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 19)


So far we have studied the procedural aspects of social choice processes. We discussed aggregation procedures — social choice rules — in general and packages of properties these aggregation procedures may satisfy. We have also studied particular aggregation procedures like the system of majority decision. In this chapter social choice processes are studied from another perspective. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the essence of politics is winning. Winning or losing — to enforce a social choice that is in accordance with one’s preference in some degree or to be forced to accept a social choice that does not accord at all with one’s preference — will now be at the center of our attention. We are now primarily interested in the formation of winning coalitions that can enforce a social choice and therefore the procedural aspects are left aside.


Social Choice Simple Game Winning Coalition Center Player Veto Player 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. A. van Deemen
    • 1
  1. 1.University of NijmegenThe Netherlands

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