The following comments are directed at two articles: “Is The Banking and Payments System Fragile?” by George J. Benston and George G. Kaufman (hereafter B-K), and “Systemic Risk in OTC Derivatives Markets: Much Ado About Not Too Much” by Franklin R. Edwards. The discussion of B-K is more extensive and comes first.
KeywordsCentral Bank Moral Hazard Deposit Insurance Bank Failure Generally Accept Accounting Principle
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