• Stuart I. Greenbaum
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 30)


The following comments are directed at two articles: “Is The Banking and Payments System Fragile?” by George J. Benston and George G. Kaufman (hereafter B-K), and “Systemic Risk in OTC Derivatives Markets: Much Ado About Not Too Much” by Franklin R. Edwards. The discussion of B-K is more extensive and comes first.


Central Bank Moral Hazard Deposit Insurance Bank Failure Generally Accept Accounting Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stuart I. Greenbaum
    • 1
  1. 1.Olin School of BusinessWashington UniversitySt. LouisUSA

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