Coping with Financial Fragility: A Global Perspective

  • Anna J. Schwartz
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 30)


Financial fragility means that the ability of the financial system to withstand economic shocks is weak. The basic reasion that the system is held to be fragile by proponents of a financial-fragility interpretation is that the financial services industry is supposedly inherently unstable. On this view, a loss of confidence in the institutions in that industry is an imminent possibility, with disruptive consequences for the real economy. The situation, however, is even more dire, according to the proponents, because financial fragility is not limited to the domestic system. It is easily transmitted internationally.


Federal Reserve Deposit Insurance Monetary Authority Foreign Bank Legal Capital 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anna J. Schwartz
    • 1
  1. 1.National Bureau of Economic ResearchNew YorkUSA

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