Banking Regulation as a Solution to Financial Fragility

  • Paul M. Horvitz
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 30)


The purpose of this article is to evaluate the role of government regulation dealing with the risk that fragility of the financial structure may lead to a collapse of the system. Other papers presented at this conference deal with the possible sources of such a collapse—the payments system, international connections, or derivative securities—and with the likelihood that the system is fragile, and the extent to which private solutions maybe adequate to deal with the problem.


Federal Reserve Deposit Insurance Banking Regulation Capital Ratio Bank Failure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul M. Horvitz
    • 1
  1. 1.University of HoustonHoustonUSA

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