Abstract
We describe two-player simultaneous-play games. First, we use a zero-sum game to illustrate minimax, dominant, and best-response strategies. We illustrate Nash equilibria in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes Games, distinguishing among three types of Nash equilibria: a pure strategy, a mixed strategy, and a continuum (partially) mixed strategy. Then we introduce the program, Nash . m, and use it to solve sample games. We display the full code of Nash . m; finally, we discuss the performance characteristics of Nash . m.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Dickhaut, J., Kaplan, T. (1993). A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria. In: Varian, H.R. (eds) Economic and Financial Modeling with Mathematica®. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2281-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2281-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4757-2283-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-2281-9
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