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A Program for Finding Nash Equilibria

  • John Dickhaut
  • Todd Kaplan

Abstract

We describe two-player simultaneous-play games. First, we use a zero-sum game to illustrate minimax, dominant, and best-response strategies. We illustrate Nash equilibria in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes Games, distinguishing among three types of Nash equilibria: a pure strategy, a mixed strategy, and a continuum (partially) mixed strategy. Then we introduce the program, Nash . m, and use it to solve sample games. We display the full code of Nash . m; finally, we discuss the performance characteristics of Nash . m.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Dominant Strategy Probability Weight 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Dickhaut
  • Todd Kaplan

There are no affiliations available

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