Designing an Incentive-Compatible Contract

  • Todd Kaplan
  • Arijit Mukherji


One of the most important problems in modern economics is concerned with the interaction of incentives, information, and economic mechanisms that solve them. This is typically posed as the problem of designing an optimal mechanism using game theory. The solution concept that is used is that of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (or refinements of that concept).


Productive Agent Indifference Curve High Type Reservation Utility Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Todd Kaplan
  • Arijit Mukherji

There are no affiliations available

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