Executive Branch Pressures on Monetary Policy: 1914–1991

  • Thomas Havrilesky


In 1913 the Federal Reserve Act established a central bank which was hailed as being independent of the executive branch of government. In recent decades this independence often seems to have been honored as much in the breach as in the keeping. On occasion, executive branch attempts to influence monetary policy have even become media events. Consequently, a consensus is emerging in the monetary policy literature which rejects as mythic the belief that the Federal Reserve is an independent, politically neutral institution. The contemporary view is that the Administration, while granting significant leeway to the Fed, when necessary obtains the monetary policy actions that it desires (e.g., Beck 1988, Friedman 1982, Poole 1985, Woolley 1984, and Lombra and Moran 1980).


Interest Rate Monetary Policy Federal Reserve Monetary Authority Executive Branch 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Havrilesky
    • 1
  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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