Abstract
Although Corcoran is mathematically correct, I believe his comment is not very helpful. In order to discuss the matter in some detail, the reader should consult table 7–1 from my original “Efficient Rent-Seeking” reproduced on page 92.1 This shows the equilibrium investment of each individual, different numbers of individuals playing the game (n), and differing values of r. Table 7–2, also reproduced on page 93, shows the total investment.
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Note
Efficient Rent-Seeking,“ in Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society,edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 1980, pp. 97–112. College Station: Texas AM University Press.
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Tullock, G. (1988). Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking: A Comment. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_9
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