Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power

  • Arye L. Hillman
  • Eliakim Katz
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)

Abstract

There is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents. However, since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable, direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by.1 As a consequence, the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity.

Keywords

Risk Aversion Social Cost Risk Averse Relative Risk Aversion Monopoly Power 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arye L. Hillman
  • Eliakim Katz

There are no affiliations available

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