Rent-Seeking in Constitutional Perspective

  • Charles K. Rowley
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)


As the essays in this book clearly indicate, Tullock’s 1967 insight was to generate an extensive literature in the political economy of rent-seeking. The debate on this important topic is still comparatively young. The dust has still to settle on a number of controversies that have arisen. Little, as yet, has been finally resolved in detail, as Tullock’s “back to the bog” lament in 1985 would seem to indicate. Yet we now know much more than was the case in 1967. What we have learned, immensely important as it is, does not however give cause for optimism concerning the efficiency of non-market decision-making. It is to this issue that the present essay addresses itself.


Collective Action Public Choice Vote Rule Rent Dissipation Constitutional Democracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Axelrod, A. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, 1984.Google Scholar
  2. Bernholz, P. The International Game of Power. Mouton, 1985.Google Scholar
  3. Breton, A. An Economic Theory of Representative Government. Macmillan, 1974.Google Scholar
  4. Buchanan, J. M. “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy.” Journal of Law and Economics II (October, 1959 ): 124–138.Google Scholar
  5. Buchanan, J.M. Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 1980.Google Scholar
  6. Buchanan, J. M. “Quest for a Tempered Utopia.” The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 1986.Google Scholar
  7. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, 1962.Google Scholar
  8. Cooter, R., and Kornhauser, L. “Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges” Journal of Legal Studies IX (January, 1980): 139–163. Downs, A. Inside Bureaucracy. Rand, 1966.Google Scholar
  9. Epstein, R. A. Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.Google Scholar
  10. Landes, W. M., and Posner, R. A. “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective.” Journal of Law and Economics XVII (December, 1975 ): 875–902.Google Scholar
  11. McCormick, R. E., and Tollison, R. D. Politicians, Legislation and the Economy. Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.Google Scholar
  12. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.Google Scholar
  13. Rowley, C.K. “The Calculus of Consent.” In C. K. Rowley (ed.), Democracy and Public Choice. Basil Blackwell, 1987.Google Scholar
  14. Rowley, C.K. “The Legacy of Keynes: From the General Theory to Generalized Budget Deficits.” In J.M. Buchanan, C.K. Rowley, and R.D. Tollison (eds.), Deficits. Basil Blackwell, 1987.Google Scholar
  15. Rowley, C.K., and Tollison, R.D. “Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection.” Swiss Journal of International Relations (Fall, 1986 ): 141–166.Google Scholar
  16. Rowley, C.K.; Shughart, W.F.; and Tollison, R. D. “Interest Groups and the Deficit.” In J.M. Buchanan, C. K. Rowley, and R.D. Tollison (eds.), Deficits. Basil Blackwell, 1987.Google Scholar
  17. Tullock, G. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 54 (June, 1967 ): 224–232.Google Scholar
  18. Tullock G. “Rents and Rent Seeking” This volume, chapter 4.Google Scholar
  19. Wagner, R.E. “Parchment, Guns, and the Maintenance of Constitutional Contract.” In C.K. Rowley (ed.), Democracy and Public Choice, Basil Blackwell, 1987.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles K. Rowley

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations