The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking pp 353-370 | Cite as
Rent-Seeking and Its Implications for Pollution Taxation
Abstract
One of the fundamental insights gained from the study of economics comes from an understanding of how market prices, arising from private property and exchange, can motivate efficient responses to the problem of scarcity. Not surprisingly, when private property rights and market exchange are deemed not to be feasible, for either technological or political reasons, economists have overwhelmingly recommended that politically imposed prices be employed as surrogates for market prices. The most extensively discussed example of this in the literature is the use of pollution taxation as a means of motivating polluters to take the full cost of their polluting activities into account.1
Keywords
Abatement Cost Marginal Benefit Total Benefit Marginal Cost Curve Pollution RatePreview
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