Government and Its Bureaucracy: A Bilateral Bargaining Versus a Principal-Agent Approach

  • Charles K. Rowley
  • Robert Elgin
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)

Abstract

Early theories of bureaucracy tended to be dominated by Weberian1 notions of impartial, efficient service by government officials concerned to serve the public interest as interpreted by their elected governments. Economists for the most part took little account, in analyzing market failure and recommending bureaucratic interventions, of the undercurrent of popular criticism of bureaucrats on grounds of laziness, insensitivity to citizen preferences, and of self-seeking behavior assumed in the theory of the firm.

Keywords

Public Choice Agency Cost Agency Problem Median Voter Residual Claim 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles K. Rowley
  • Robert Elgin

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations