Dispelling the Disinterest in Deregulation

  • Michael A. Crew
  • Charles K. Rowley
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy book series (TREP, volume 1)

Abstract

The penetration of competitive markets by laws and regulations is a highly durable and robust intrusion in the U.S. economy. Despite a not inconsiderable and continuing presence of highly articulate advocates both of laissez faire and of liberty, the U.S. economy is arguably as tightly regulated as the more socialistic economies of Western Europe. Even the outbreak of deregulation in specific markets during the early 1980s lost force by the mid-decade as the pro-regulation interest groups began to regain control of relevant markets. The forthcoming re-regulation of U.S. railroads is a predictable outcome of such a regrouping at the present time, as was epitomized by the “change of mind” of Commissioner Andre, a free-market exponent, who voted with the majority of the I.C.C. in late 1986 in favour of railroad re-regulation.

Keywords

Public Choice Rent Seeker Monopoly Rent Production Possibility Frontier Rent Dissipation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael A. Crew
  • Charles K. Rowley

There are no affiliations available

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