Residential Proximity, Perceived and Acceptable Risk

Abstract

The perception of risk and the acceptance of it are partially a product of life experiences. This occurs because “ordinary-knowledge” is principally comprised of experiences, and the perception and acceptability of risk rests firmly upon that “data bank” of knowledge. Hence, life-experience is inherently related to perceived and acceptable risk. This paper focuses on the relationship between the life experiences associated with residential proximity, and the perception and acceptability of the risks associated with generating electricity in nuclear power plants. Perceived risk is operationally defined in t erms of estimated likelihood of occurrence, while acceptability of nuclear power is defined in terms of people’s favorable or unfavorable opinions regarding nuclear power plants. In the context of a simple social-structural model of perceived and acceptable risk, four potential explanations for enhanced acceptability among those residentially proximate with nuclear facilities are examined: 1) Residents, through the experience of living with hazard, are reinforced toward assigning lower probabilities to the potential risks associated with nuclear facilities. 2) The cognitive dissonance created by the acceptance of the risks associated with nuclear power is decreased by reducing perceived risk. 3) Nuclear neighbors are predisposed toward, educated about, and/or economically dependent upon nuclear power hence the more favorable attitudes toward it. 4) Nearby residents are systematically more altruistic — other oriented — than the general population and thus more willing to bear the risks associated with nuclear power. Low-probability/high-consequence risks are sometimes assessed in terms of revealed societal preferences. However, assessing risk in this manner without careful consideration of social processes involved is somewhat superficial and misleading. In this sense, a more complete understanding of the social processes involved in the perception and acceptability of risk is essential. The examination of these four hypotheses provides a foundation on which such an understanding may be established.

The data were originally collected under Defense Civil Prepardness Contract (No. DCPA01-77-C-0218), under the direction of Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa. The author accepts full responsibility for the contents herein and gratefully acknowledges the support and criticisms offered by colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh.