Abstract
The principle voiced in the maxim, stare decisis et non quieta movere — to stand by precedents and not to disturb what is settled—has been known to all systems of judicature. Former judicial decisions as a source of law were recognized as far back as the ancient Egyptians. In some measure this principle operated in the Roman law and is not without force in those modern outgrowths of the Roman system.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 92 (1908).
Moyer v. Peabody. 212 U. S. 84 (1909).
The following may be used as an illustration: In Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 365 (February, 1911), Mr. Chief Justice White, in delivering the opinion, said, “We must then either reconcile the cases, or, if this cannot be done, determine which line rests upon the right principle, and having so determined, overrule or qualify the others and apply and enforce the correct doctrine.” In this particular case Ex parte Howard, 105 U. S. 578, and the cases following it were applied; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, and cases following it, distinguished; and Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, In re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, and In re Winn, 213 U. S. 458 disapproved in part and qualified.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1974 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Collins, C.W. (1974). Stare Decisis. In: The Fourteenth Amendment and the States. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1442-5_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1442-5_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4757-1444-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-1442-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive