Abstract
The substantive criminal law states rules of conduct and prescribes sanctions — usually a range of sanctions — for violation of these rules.
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References
See generally LAFAVE and SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972);
ISRAEL and LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (1975);
KADISH and PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (3d ed. 1975).
See generally FOX, THE LAW OF JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1977);
FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE (1972);
MILLER, DAWSON, DIX, and PARNAS, JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS (2d ed. 1976).
The term “developmental disability” is a creature of federal and, later, state legislation that was initially created to coordinate funding and provision of services for persons with epilepsy, mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and autism be-cause of a sense that such persons share many common service needs. The term has since come into broad use among professionals and, increasingly, with the lay public.
In a review of major criminal justice reform proposals that have been sponsored by the American Bar Association, tho American Law Institute, and the Council of State Governments, Fox notes that little mention is made of the special complications introduced when a defendant is mentally retarded. Fox, The Criminal Reform Movement, in PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION (PCMR) THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 627, 629–636 (Kindred et al. eds. 1976).
On the police function, see generally Adams, LAW ENFORCEMENT — AN Introduction TO THE POLICE ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION (Approved Draft, 1973);
MILLER, THE POLICE FUNCTION (1971);
FELKENES and BECKER, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A SELECTED Bibliography (2d ed. 1977).
See CEREBRAL PALSY — ITS INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY PROBLEMS 195 (speech impairment) and 434 (mobility impairments) (2d ed. Cruickshank ed. 1966).
While a susceptibility to seizures is a symptom associated with epilepsy, almost eighty per cent of persons with epilepsy can achieve reasonable control of their seizures through proper medication. BARROW and FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 1966). On the current status of persons with epilepsy under state laws, see EPILEPSY FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH EPILEPSY (1976).
In Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a landmark United States Supreme Court decision prescribing procedures required in police interrogations in order to protect fundamental rights of suspects, the Court noted a substantial body of literature describing police interrogation procedures and instructing police officers in how best to induce a suspect to confess. Id. at 448–454.
U.S. Const, amend. V.
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Bram vs. United States, 168 U.S. 532(1897).
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy vs. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25(1972).
Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id.
Id.
Id. (with respect to statements); United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971) (physical evidence); see also Silver-thorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and Wong Sun vs. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). While statements made in circumstances that violate the Miranda rules cannot be used as direct evidence against the defendant, they can in some circumstances be used to impeach, or undermine the credibility of, the defendant who testifies on his or her own behalf at trial. Oregon vs. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); cf. Mincey vs. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385(1978).
MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (Grossman ed. 1977); see also Scheerenberger, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, ana Prevalence, in ROTHSTEIN, MENTAL RETARDATION — READINGS AND RESOURCES 4 (2d ed. 1971).
While the criminal process is sufficiently complex and the risks sufficiently great that it is hard to imagine anyone “intelligently” waiving his or her right to counsel, the developmentally disabled person presents an extreme case of the paradox implicit in the motion of an “intelligent” waiver of counsel.
See Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–456 (1966).
Fikes vs. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196–198 (1957).
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–456 (1966); Davis vs. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966); Blackburn vs. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Spano vs. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959); Fikes vs. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957); Powell vs. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
E.g., cases cited in note 22; see also United States vs. Henderson, 520 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied 423 U.S. 998 (1975); Thomas vs. North Carolina, 447 F.2d 1320, 1322 (4th Cir. 1971); Hizel Vs. Sigler, 430 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1970); Smallwood v. Warden, 367 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1966). In Blackburn vs. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, the Court noted that Blackburn had a history of mental illness (Id. at 203) and stated: Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being on-the basis of a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion. Id., at 207.
See e.g., United States vs. Marchildon, 519 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1975); cf. Brewer vs. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
ADAMS, supra note 5, at 145; ABA, supra note 5, at 59.
See generally MILLER, Prosecution: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969);
Aba, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971);
Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 383 (1976);
LaFàve, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 532 (1970). NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE, AN ANNOTATED Bibliography (1975).
MILLER, supra note 26, at 154–292; LAGOY, SENNA, and SIEGEL, An Empirical Study on Information Usage for Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 435 (1976)
INBAU, THOMPSON, HADDAD, ZAGEL, and STARKMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 487 (1974); ABA, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE supra note 26, at §§3.8 and 3.9.
MILLER, supra note 26, at 186 and 214–218; INBAU, et al., supra note 27, at 487; Lagoy et al., supra note 27, at 446–447 and 450–451 ; JACOBY, supra note 27, at 26; Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 519, 529 (1969).
See discussion infra, at 8–11.
See discussion infra, at 15–16.
See discussion infra, at 11 – 15.
See discussion supra, at 3–5.
Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). The thrust of Professor Davis’ recommendations is toward internal, “administrative law”, rather than “legislative”, controls on discretion; most of the literature has followed this lead. See also Cox, supra note 26; Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 651 (1976); Noll, Controlling a Prosecutor’s Screening Discretion Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW 697 (1978); but see Cardinale and Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29 SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW 659 (1978). For a very thoughtful, albeit general, discussion of the nature and importance of discretion, see Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 University of Chicago Law Review 427 (1960).
United States vs. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. en banc 1973); Dixon vs. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States vs. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), cert, denied 381 U.S. 935.
MILLER, supra note 26, at 16; JACOBY, supra, note 27. See also two Justice Department documents issued under cover of a January 18, 1977, memoranda by then Attorney General Edward Levi to U.S. attorneys and the heads of all Justice Department Offices, to provide guidance in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 24 CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 3001 (1978).
Drope vs. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also Pate vs. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bishop vs. U.S., 350 U.S. 961 (1956). For federal cases, the court must determine whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him.” Dusky vs. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The Supreme Court also ruled in Drope and Pate that judges must initiate an inquiry on the competence issue when “sufficient indicia” of lack of competence come to their attention. Neither case specifically indicates what constitutes “sufficient indicia”, although a statute approved by the Court in Drope required a hearing where the evidence raises a “bona fide doubt” concerning competence. The doctrine regarding competence to stand trial has ancient roots in the criminal justice system. Blackstone stated: “[l]f a man . . . commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with the advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried, for how can he make his defense.” 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (1665). Many of the early English and American authorities are cited in Youtsey vs. United States, 97 F.937 (6th Cir. 1899), a case in which a loss of memory due to repeated epileptic seizures was the cause for lack of competence to stand trial.
The term “insane” was often used both in this context and in reference to criminal responsibility, creating considerable confusion between these two very different problems. Comment, Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1078(1961).
For a thorough, well-documented discussion of this procedure, see Weihofen, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428–474 (1954).
BRAKEL and ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 412 (2d ed. 1971).
A 1960 study of 755 persons committed to lona (Michigan) State Hospital as incompetent to stand trial estimated on the basis of past rates that well over one-half of these persons would “expect to spend the rest of their lives at the hospital.” Comment, supra note 37, at 1088. While many forms of mental illness can be treated, especially with modern psychotropic drugs, the prospect of long term confinement is probably disproportionately great for severely mentally retarded defendants. HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS, 65 (1973); Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre-Post-Jackson Analysis, 40 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW 659, 673 (1973).
The first piece in the modern, critical literature on competency determination procedures was a comment on a case where the dismissal of indictments agaînst three co-defendants made it clear that criminal prosecution was precluded. The fourth co-defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and indefinitely committed. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 832 (1960), discussing United States vs. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
The negative effects of the doctrine have even led to proposals that it be abolished. See BURT and MORRIS, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 66, 75 (1972); Morris, Special Doctrinal Treatment in Criminal Law, in P.C.M.R., supra note 4, at 682. For a vigorous attack on the Burt-Morris position, see Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 21 (1977).
406 U.S. 715(1972).
Id., at 720.
Id., at 738.
Procedures to provide such opportunity have been advocated by commentators (e.g. Foote, supra note 41, at 845) and by the American Law Institute. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI), MODEL PENAL CODE §4.06 (3) and §4.06 Alternative (3) and (4). The Supreme Court in Jackson acknowledged, with apparent favor, such suggestions for reform. 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972).
An additional issue, which in the present state of science concerns primarily defendants where incompetence results from mental illness, is whether a person can be tried while on a drug regimen that reestablishes competence. On this question, see KUNZ, PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1974);
Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL 769 (1977).
The courts have emphasized over the centuries that “free will” is the postulate of responsibility under our jurisprudence. 4 BLACKSTONES COMMENTARIES 27. United States vs. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (1972). See also FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 801–802 (1978); LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra, note 1 at 9–10.
The term “insanity defense” has long been used. The Model Penal Code replaced it with “defense of not responsible because of mental disease or defect.” The literature on the topic is voluminous.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 48 (1967); LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1 at 275; WEIHOFEN, supra note 38, at 119.
LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1, at 305.
Nevertheless, a defendant can plead both “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity”, thus leaving the jury with three possible verdicts, the two foregoing plus “guilty “ LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1, at 316.
See Chart VII, infra.
LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra, note 1 at 305. But see Singer, Insanity Acquittals in the Seventies: Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 406 (1978), for a series of counter-intuitive findings, particularly on the frequent use of the insanity defense in minor crimes. The article reviews the cases of persons coming up for review hearings required by State vs. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1975).
See e.g., Lynch vs. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1961); Bolton vs. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); and cases cited in notes 57 and 58 infra.
395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id., at 651.
People vs. McNeliy, 371 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1975); State vs. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1975); State ex rel. Kovach vs. Schubert, 21Ô N.W.2d 341 (Wise. 1974); app. dismd. 419 U.S. 1117 (1975) and cert. den. 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); People vs. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 1974); Wilson vs. State, 287 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1972).
State vs. Kent, 515 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. 1974); State vs. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1974); State vs. Maik, 287 A.2d 715 (1972); Lindner vs. Peterson, 324 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Chase vs. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132 (Me. 1971); State ex rel. Schöpf vs. Schubert, 173 N.W.2d 673, (Wis. 1970). Pre-Bolton cases are listed in50A.L.R.3d134.
State ex rel. Schöpf vs. Schubert, 173 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 1970); State vs. Maik, 287 A.2d 715 (1972).
State ex rel. Kovack vs. Schubert, 219 N.W.2d 341, appl. dismd. 419 U.S. 1117; State vs. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975).
In at least one state, the use of the insanity defense seems to be increasing, although it is unclear how this increase is related to the increase in criminal cases in general. A comprehensive study of acquittals “by reason of insanity” in New York state has shown that from 1965 to 1971 the average was eight per year, from 1971 to 1976 the average was forty-seven per year, and from mid-1976 to mid-1978 the average was fifty-six per year. The ratio of its use in non-homicide cases has gone from 47% in 1965–1976 to 65% in 1976–1978. STEADMAN and BURTON, CHARACTERISTICS AND DISPOSITIONS OF INSANITY ACQUITTALS IN NEW YORK STATE: AN UPDATE [to THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CASEY, infra, note 78] for 7/1/76 through 6/30/78 (Circular of N.Y. Dept. Mental Hygiene, 1979).
Bolton vs. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (1968).
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 25 (1975);
Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 693 (1974);
Cocozza and Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1084 (1976).
The various formulations of the defense and the debates over their effects, merits, and deficiencies are extensively reviewed in BRAKEL and ROCK, supra 39, at 376–392. 65 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The test articulated by the court is: [l]t must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing- of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. Id. at 722.
WEIHOFEN, supra, note 38, at 51, 68–69 (1954). Weihofen notes that “[t]he wording of this . . . test varies so extensively, however, that it is impossible to mention all the ways In which it has been phrased.” Id. at 69.
See generally BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 39, at 380; WEIHOFEN, supra note 38; Keedy, Irresistable Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 956 (1952).
State vs. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871); State vs. Pike, 49 N.H. 399(1869).
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 874. The Durham case was the subject of great scholarly interest and discussion, but was adopted only in Maine and the Virgin Islands.
See e.g., GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness — Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 University of Chicago Law Review 320 (1955); Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE LAW JOURNAL 905 (1961). See also BRAKEL and ROCK, supra, note 39, at 389–391 and works cited therein.
United States vs. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972).
A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The brackets in the test indicate optional phrasing for the states.
No jurisdiction by jurisdiction analysis of the case-law on this point exists. However, in Nail vs. State, 328 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1959); Reece vs. State, 94 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 1956), Washington vs. State, 85 N.W.2d 509 (Neb. 1957); State vs. Huff, 102 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1954), a defendant of very low intelligence unsuccessfully claimed that his mental deficiency was sufficient to invoke the “insanity” defense. In each case the court indicated that mental deficiency could bring a defendant within the defense, but only if the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong.
BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 39, at 382, n. 50.
A study of court records of thirty-one randomly selected mentally retarded prisoners found that the “insanity defense” had only been raised in one case. Brown and Courtless, The Mentally Retarded in Penal and Correctional Institutions, 124 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PYSCHIATRY 1164 (1968).
See generally Person, The Accused Retardate, 4 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 239 (1972); Tupin and Goolish-ian, Mental Retardation and Legal Responsibility, 18 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 673 (1969); Allen, The Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated in Prison, 32 FEDERAL PROBATION 22 (1968); Burgess, The Mental Defective and the Law, 23 INTRAMURAL LAW REVIEW OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 115 (1967); Allen, Toward an Exceptional Offenders Court, 4 MENTAL RETARDATION 3 (1966).
See e.g., LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1, at 325; Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 827 (1977); Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in G’rading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 313 (1971). Comment, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A. LAW REVIEW 561 (1971). Concern with the insanity defense has also led to a number of recommendations for its abolition. See Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 514 (1968) and works there cited. But see Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?—Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 719 (1973). The United State Justice Departments federal criminal law reform bill, which has not been enacted, originally advocated abolition of insanity as a defense to déferai crimes. S. 1400, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975). See Reisner and Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 753 (1974); Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to “Abolish” the Insanity Defense in S. 1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 687 (1976); Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of the Administration’s Proposed Criminal Code—An Essay, 9 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 434 (1973). The New York Department of Mental Hygiene has also recommended abolition of the insanity defense. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY (1978). Several attempts to abolish the defense early in this century were held unconstitutional. State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910): Sinclair vs. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); cf. United States vs. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (1972). But see Powell vs. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), and especially Justice Black’s concurring opinion. Id at 545. Coupling abolition with adoption of the doctrine of “diminished capacity” would probably meet constitutional objections to crime without fault.
LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1, at 191.
See cases collected in annotation at 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228, 1225. See generally, LAFAVE and SCOTT, supra note 1, at 325.
A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
See cases collected at 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228, 1238.
Even where the diminished capacity defense is broadly accepted, it is sometimes excluded with respect to particular offenses where it is determined that only a “general intent” and no “specific intent” is required for the offense. For a discussion of this distinction and the policy judgments it may clothe, see opinion of Justice Traynor in People vs. Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1970). See also People vs. Nance, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1972).
See United States vs. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Diminished Capacity—Recent Decisions and An Analytical Approach, 30 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 213, 216, 226 (1977).
A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment to § 7.07 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1954).
A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Id., at § 7.07 (2).
Id., at § 4.02 (2).
See e.g., A Symposium: Capital Punishment in the United States, 14 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 1 (1978) and works cited there.
See generally, Liebman and Shephard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the “Boiler Plate”: Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 757 (1978).
CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE § 6300 (West 1973); OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED § 2947.24 (Page 1975); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE § 22–3503 (1973).
Ohio House Bill 565, 112th General Assembly, 1977–1978.
Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems, 56 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 602 (1970); McGarry and Cotton, A Study in Civil Commitment: The Massachusetts Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 6 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 263 (1969).
Schreiber, supra note 94, at 603, 616.
Id., at 605, 624; Wexler, Therapeutic Justice 57 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 289, 296 (1972).
Wexler, supra note 96, at 323.
O’Connor vs. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
E.g., Wyatt vs. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd. sub nom Wyatt vs. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Welsch vs. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 D. Minn. 1974); Davis vs. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
Spicer vs. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291 (1926); Estelle vs. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See Klein, Prisoner’s Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 7 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 1 (1979).
Bowring vs. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). The court held that a prisoner is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising medical certainty concludes (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease is curable or may be alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care would be substantial.
Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980).
Morrissey vs. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478, (1971).
Id., at 447. FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1976); NACJJDP, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Advance Draft 1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1977); [OHIO] ATTORNEY GENERAL’S JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN (1976); WISCONSIN COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS (1975); GOVERNOR’S ADULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Final Draft 1977).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1967).
Dennis, Mental Retardation and Corrections: A Research Perspective, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW, 34 (M. Santamour ed. 1975): Friel, The Mentally Retarded Offender — Texas CAMIO Research Project, id., at 95; Morales vs. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev’d on other grounds 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
For example: The dispute over the proper tests of insanity that has so preoccupied the courts in recent times is essentially concerned with the question of fairness. Is it fair to convict of crime, [sic] when the defendant, though knowing right from wrong, as the result of mental illness or incapacity, is unable to exercise the restraints upon his [or her] conduct that would enable him [or her] to conform to acceptable standards. It would seem incongruous that this great outpouring of concern should be lavished only upon adults who may be criminals while the children whom we profess to be particular objects of solicitude are bypassed. We conclude that the defense of insanity must be permitted in a juvenile delinquency procedure if those proceedings are to conform to the minimum Kent standards of due process and fair treatment. In re Winburn, 32 Wis.2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1966). On both competency and the insanity defense, see In re Causey, 363 So.2d 472 (La. S. Ct. 1978).
For example: If anti-social acts are committed by children as a result of emotional disturbances, mental retardation or deficiency, or defect of reason due to mental disease, the court is charged by statute with providing the proper treatment, rehabilitative measures or therapy. This cannot be accomplished without first determining that the jurisdictional basis for judicial intervention exists — that is, that the offense was committed. State of New Jersey in the Interest of H.C., 106 N.J.. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322–323 (1969).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1967).
Donovan, supra note 105; Popkin and Lippert, Is There a Constitutional Right to the Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 Journal of Family Law 421, 423–424 (1971).
See THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW, supra note 111.
E.g., M. PRESCOTT and E. VAN HOUTEN, A STUDY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS IN NEW JERSEY (1979); Donovan, supra note 105 at 246–249.
E.g., Morales vs. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev’d on other grounds 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); NACJJDP (1977) supra note 109.
Few if any juvenile codes deal with these issues in any detail.
Even when there is no explicit statutory authority for the court to initiate an inquiry into the defendant’s competence to stand trial, Pate vs. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) requires courts to undertake such an inquiry when there are “sufficient indicia” of the defendant’s lack of competence.
Supra note 36.
Supra note 45.
As noted above, however, courts have generally interpreted these statutes to include at least mental retardation. See authorities listed in supra note 74.
BROWN and COURTLESS, THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER (1971); SANTAMOUR and WEST, THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER AND CORRECTIONS (1977).
Plotkin, Stranded in the Jungle: The Mentally Retarded Person in the Criminal Justice System, 1 DISTRICT LAWYER 37–38 (1977);
Fox, The Criminal Reform Movement, PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION 636 (1976);
Haggerty, Kane and Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 59 (1972).
See sections 4–6, 14, and 16.
See sections 7(2), 8(4), 10(5), 10(10), 11(2), 12(2) and 15.
See sections 3(15), 6, 8(4), 8(5), 8(6), 10(6), 10(7), 10(11), and 11(3).
See sections 8(6), 10(7) and 12(2).
See sections8(6)-(8); 10(8)-(11); and 12(2)(f) and (3).
See sections 8(5)(d)(ii) and (6); 10(6)(c)(ii) and (7); and 12(1) and (2).
Section 8(1).
Section 10(2).
Section 13.
Section 14.
Section 15.
Section 16.
383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 538 (1970); McKeiver vs. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Breed vs. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
Section 7.
Section 9.
See sections 7(5)-(8) and 9(6)-(11).
See sections 4 and 16. * Richard Van Duizend had primary responsibility for drafting this model statute aided by a prior draft prepared by Michael Kindred.
42 UNITED STATES CODE §5603(1) (Supp. 1979).
See Chapter 4: Zoning for Community Homes, supra.
See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS (IJA/ABA) STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DISPOSITION, §§ 2.10 and 2.11 (Tentative Draft, 1977).
E.g., ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES, ch. 38, §1005–6.1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979).
E.g., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE ANN. §16–710 (1973).
See sections 8(5) and 10(6).
See section 4.
For a discussion of the intent of and basis for this definition, see section 3(2) of the Developmentally Disabled Juvenile Offenders Act, infra.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES (NAPSA), PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DIVERSION: DIVERSION, 131 (Approved Draft 1978).
42 UNITED STATES CODE §6001(7) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (Pub. L 94–103 as amended by Pub. L. 95–1780).
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS (ACMRDD), STANDARDS FOR SERVICES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS §1.2 (1977).
Norley, Brick Savvy and Retardation, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 125, 128 (M. San-tamour, Ed. 1975); Norley, The Least Restrictive Alternative and the Police Investigatory Process, in THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION (PCMR), THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW, 525–526 (1976); See MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, INC., THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER IN MISSOURI (1976).
Chambers, The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative: The Constitutional Issues, in PCMR, supra note 12, at 486.
20 UNITED STATES CODE §§1401 ef seq. (1978).
20 UNITED STATES CODE §1401 (1978); 42 U.S.C. §6012(b) (Supp. 1979).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, §2.1 (Approved Draft 1971).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, §§1.1(b) and 2.2 (Approved Draft 1973); PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (PLEAJ) TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, 13–17 (1967).
E.g., a case reported of a man who was jailed after dropping his pants and running from a restaurant due to a psychomotor seizure which caused him to feel that he had to urinate. The Kansas City Times, September 15,1976 at 2B; The Jefferson City (Mo.) Post-Tribune, September 17,1976.
See authority cited supra note 12.
A number of states already have a similar provision. See EPILEPSY FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH EPILEPSY, 3–5 (1976).
See section 3(14).
The term “taking into custody” is used in place of “arrest” because it is more compatible with the language of the juvenile codes of many states. The terms are used interchangeably in the adult context.
Supra note 18.
U.S. CONST, amend. V; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
E.g., Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
384 U.S. 436, (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
E.g., Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, Custodial Interrogation in Our Nation’s Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. LAW REVIEW 1347, 1375 (1979); Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENVER LAW JOURNAL 1, 15–16, 33 (1970).
Krause, The Retarded Citizen and The Criminal Justice System, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 23, 24; PRESIDENT’S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION (PPMR), REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW, 33 (1963); see Argrisani, Police Assistance in Mental Retardation Cases in NEW ENGLAND SEMINAR ON RETARDED YOUTH AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, THE NAIVE OFFENDER: FORMAT AND ESSAYS, 41, 49 (1971); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY (AAMD), CONSENT HANDBOOK (1977); T. GRISSO, COMPETENCE OF JUVENILES TO WAIVE RIGHTS (1979).
GRISSO, id.; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
For a discussion of these exceptions, see e.g., J. LASOTA and G. BROMLEY, MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES (1974); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS, 266–372 (4th Ed. 1974).
Schneckcloth vs. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
LASOTA and BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 49.
See authorities listed supra in note
m AAMD, supra note 30.
For a discussion of this standard, see the comment to section 4(4).
See section 13(5). » AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (ALI) MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGN-MENT PROCEDURE, §240.2 (1975); accord LASOTA and BROMLEY, 39.supra note 32, at 51 and 53; IJA/ABA, POLICE, supra note 22 at 67–68.
ALI, id:., IJA/ABA, POLICE, supra note 22, at 67.
Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
ABA, POLICE, supra note 17, at §5.3; see, e.g., Mapp vs. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda vs. Arizona 304 U.S. 436 (1966); Harris vs. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Wong Sun vs. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS, §4.4 (1973); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved Draft 1968); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICE AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DIVERSION: PRETRIAL RELEASE (1978); IJA/ABA, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 3.
In the Matter of Savoy, Juvenile Case No. J-4808–70, at 30–31 (D.C. Super. Ct. January 11, 1973) as quoted in IJA/ABA, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 3, at 3 n.5.
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz vs. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N.W. 2d 255 (1969); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION (NDAA), NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, 126–128 (1977); THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (PCLEAJ), THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 133 (1967).
See section 3(14) and the comment thereto and sections 4(1)-4(3).
Consider, for example, the case described supra, note 28.
See NDAA, supra note 45, at 126.
See, e.g., (PCLEAJ), supra note 45, at 133–134; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43 at 72–97. For a definition of diversion, see the comment to section 3(8).
PCLEAJ, id.
See generally Leeke, Mentally Retarded Adult Offenders in the South Carolina Criminal Justice System, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED„CITI-ZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 75; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH (NIMH), DIVERSION FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1973).
E.g., NAPSA, supra note 9, at 19.
For a discussion of authorization techniques and examples of existing diversion rules and statutes, see ABA, AUTHORIZING TECHNIQUES FOR PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS. A SURVIVAL KIT (1977).
See comment to section 12(1)(b).
NAPSA, supra note 9, at §1.3.
See subsection (3) of this section regarding the contents of pretrial diversion agreements and section 3(11) for a definition of evaluation. See also section 15-Evaluations and Examinations.
NAPSA, supra note 9, at 39–41, 56–57; see also subsection (3) of this section and sections 13(1) and 13(2).
AAMD, supra note 30, at 8–10.
NAPSA, supra note 9, at 38.
Id., at 57.
For an outline and discussion of the content of Program Plans, see section 3(19) and the comment thereto.
NAPSA, supra note 9, at 75; see the definition of least restrictive alternative in §3(15).
See NIMH, supra note 51. «4 (PCLEAJ), TASK FORCE REPORT. COURTS, 9 (1967).
See e.g., Lottman, Jumping on the Bandwagon, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 257, 258.
Cf. Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra.
See M. PRESCOTT AND E. VAN HOUTEN, A STUDY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS IN NEW JERSEY (1979).
United States vs. Masthers, 539 F. 2d 721, 725, (1976); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Note, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard; 1974 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 149, 151–152 (1974); our see Burt and Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea 40 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 66 (1972).
An adversary trial presupposes an accused who is capable of defending himself against the accusations of the state. But the trial of a person, totally out of contact with reality, would be arbitrary and irrational, and would tend to undermine public confidence in the entire system. Bennett, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE 569, 570 (1968); see Comment Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 454, 458(1967).
Bennett, id., at 570–573.
A. ROBEY, CRITERIA FOR COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: A CHECKLIST FOR PSYCHIATRISTS (1965); Brakel, Presumption, Bias, and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 1105, 1129–1130 (1974); see also Bennett, supra note 69, at 574; Ennis, CLU Client Crazy but Competent, 17 CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NEW YORK 2 (1969).
Mental Health Law Project (MHLP), Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change — Incompetence to Stand Trial on Criminal Charges, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 617, 626–627 (1978).
See Bennett, supra note 69, at 573–577; ROBEY supra note 71, at 619; Wieter vs. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321–322 (W.D. Mo. 1961); Brakel, supra note 71.
Schoeller vs. Dunbar, 423 F. 2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir., 1970), (Hufstedler J. dissenting) cert, denied 400 U.S. 834 (1970); Seiling vs. Eyman, 478 F. 2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973).
Seiling vs. Eyman, id., United States vs. Masthers 539 F. 2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Note, supra note 68, at 168.
Pate vs. Robinson 383 U.S. 375 (1966) held that trial judges have a duty to raise the question themselves when it appears the defendant is not competent.
MHLP, supra note 72, at 620; Ennis, supra note 71 at 3; A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, 207 (1975).
MHLP,/tf.
Section 8(5)(e).
Ennis, supra note 71, at 2.
Stack vs. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4–5 (1951).
Burt and Morris, supra note 68, at 88; STONE, supra note 78, at 208–209; MHLP, supra note 72, at 620–621.
Also section 5 of this act.
MHLP, supra note 72, at 621 and 637; STONE supra note 78, at 209.
Pate vs. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope vs. Missouri 420 U.S. 162 (1975), e.g., Massie vs. Blankenship, 469 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Va. 1979).
MHLP, supra note 72, at 621 ; ROBEY, supra note 71 ; but see Brakel, supra note 71.
Brakel, supra note 71.
For a definition of multidisciplinar/ evaluation team, see section 3(16); see also sections 3(11) and 15.
Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra.
See sections 15(4)(a) and (4)(c).
Pate vs. Robinson 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
MHLP, supra note 72, at 624; GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT 177 (1976); e.g., State vs. Buie 254 S.E. 2d 26 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Hollister, Psychotropic Drugs and Court Competence, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER (I. Irvine and T. Brelje, eds.) as quoted in MHLP, supra note 72, at 626; Stone, supra note 78, at 213–215.
E.g., State vs. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P. 2d 323 (1960); Burt and Morris, supra note 68, at 85–86.
See section 13(3); MHLP, supra note 72, at 626.
Jackson vs. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1971).
Id. at 738–739; see chart III supra.
Burt and Morris, supra note 68, at 92; MHLP, supra note 72, at 62; Stone, supra note 78, at 212.
Burt and Morris, id., at 77–78; Bennett, supra note 69, at 571.
See Chart III, supra.
Burt and Morris, supra note 68, at 93–95; MHLP supra note 72, at 629–631.
MHLP, id. at 631–632.
N.B. Once it has been determined that a defendant is unable to become competent to stand trial within a reasonable time, the purpose of providing services is to assist that person to be able to live safely in the community.
See also section 8(5)(e).
For a discussion of the 1 year time limitation, see the comment to section 8(5)(c).
See definition in section 3(10).
See definition of habilitative services in section 3(13) supra and the comment thereto.
See definition of program plan in section 3(19); see also section 8(6).
See MHLP, supra note 72, at 625; accord Burt and Morris, supra note 68, at 94; see also sections 8(7)(a) and (b).
Chart IV supra.
Chart III supra.
Stone, supra note 78, at 205–206; Bennett, supra note 69, at 570–571.
See section 3(1) for a definition of community-based facility.
Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
See section 3(15) for the definition of least restrictive alternative.
See the comment to section 5 on pretrial release.
Jackson vs. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1971).
Id., at 737 (dicta); Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (dicta).
Shah, Social Interactions of Law and Mental Health in Handling Social Deviance, 23 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 674, 705–706 (1974).
See section 10(6)(d); of D.C. Code §23–1322 (1973).
See section 3(10) for the definition of developmental disabilities agency.
See PCMR, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: MENTAL RETARDATION, CENTURY OF DECISION, 92–93 (1976); ACMRDD supra note 11, at xix, 11 (1978).
PCMR, id., at 93; see section 13(5).
But see section 7 on informal dispositions, section 10(7) on criminal responsibility, section 11 on sentencing and section 12 on corrections.
See Bennett, supra note 69, at 571.
See Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra.
See Bennett, supra note 69, at 582.
See sources listed supra notes 111 and 112.
In addition, this paragraph together with section 8(12) requires a hearing upon a receipt of notice that a person with a developmental disability is residing in a facility pursuant to an order of the court following a finding prior to the effective date of this act, that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.
See sections 8(5)(d) and (e), and 8(6)(a).
United States vs. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959); for a discussion of this case see Foote, A Comment on Pretrial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 832 (1960).
ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §4.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see ILLINOIS GOVERNORS COMMISSION supra note 94, at 177.
MHLP, supra note 72 at 640.
Chart IV supra.
406 U.S. 715, 740–741 (1971).
ILLINOIS GOVERNORS COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 177; Foote, supra note 133 at 846.
See MHLP, supra note 72, at 618; Ennis, supra note 71, at 3; STONE supra note 78, at 207; Bennett, supra note 69, at 573.
See Steadman and Braff, Effects of Incompetency Determinations on Subsequent Criminal Processing: Implications for Due Process, 23 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 754 (1974); S. BRAKEL and R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 417 (Rev. ed. 1971).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, §18–4.7 (2d Ed. Approved Draft 1979); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISION, supra note 43, at §5.8; ILLINOIS GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 185; MHLP, supra note 72, at 643; see also ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 134, at §7.09.
E.g., ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES ch. 38, §1005–2–2 (Smith-Hurd 1973) and TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE ANNOTATED §46.02(9) (Vernon 1977) (mandatory credit); DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED tit. 11, §404(1975) (credit within discretion of the court).
See, e.g., (pro) ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft 1968); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION (NDAA) supra note 45, at 214–277; Santobello vs. New York, 404 U.S. 275 (1971); (con) NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 42–49 (1973); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1179 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 50 (1968); Casper, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE (1972).
Kercheval vs. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); McCarthy vs. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
Boykin vs. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–243 (1969).
Id., at 244.
North Carolina vs. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Cf. section 4(4) and 4(5); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE supra note 28, at §13.1; NACJJDP, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, §3.175(1976).
See section 13(1) and (2).
See AAMD, supra note 30.
See section 13(5).
E.g., ALI, MODEL PRE-ARRANGEMENT CODE, supra note 39, at §§350.4 and 350.5; FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11(e) (1975); ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 17.4 (1973).
See sources cited in note 152 and ABA, supra note 143, at §1.5; San-tobello vs. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
United States vs. Masthers, 539 F. 2d 721, 728–729 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see AAMD, supra note 30.
Seiling vs. Eyman, 478 F. 2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United States vs. Masthers, id.; but see Malinauskus vs. United States 531 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1974).
Note, supra note 68, at 170–171.
North Carolina vs. Alford 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
E.g., FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11(f) (1975); ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 17.3 (1973); ALI, MODEL PRE-ARRANGEMENT CODE, supra note 39, at §350.4(3); ABA, GUILTY PLEAS supra note 143, at §1.6.
But see ALI, id.
Accord United States vs. Masthers, 539 F. 2d 721 (DC. Cir. 1976).
Supra note 143, at §2.1.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56; see Haggerty, Kane, and Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 59 (1972).
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 32(d) (1975).
ABA, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 143, at §2.1; ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 17.4 (1975).
ALI, supra note 134, at §4.01.
E.g., Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense — Why Not? 72 YALE LAW JOURNAL 853 (1963); Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense -No!, 8 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 629 (1971); Monahan, Abolish the In-sanity Defense? — Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 719 (1973); Allen, The Brawner Rule — New Lyrics for an Old Tune, 1973; WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 67 (1973); for a discussion of the development of the rules, policies, and practices governing criminal responsibility and the summary of the various arguments, see BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 376–408.
ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 134, at §4.01(1).
Id., at §4.02(1).
Comment, Diminished Capacity — Recent Cases and an Analytical Approach, 130 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 213, 217 (1977); Chart V, supra.
Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal 41 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 514, 516 (1968); see the introduction to this report and BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 376–408.
But see Note, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW 622, 644–649 (1975) and the sources cited in footnotes 75 and 76 of the introduction to this report, supra.
MNaughtens Case 8 Eng Rep. 718 (1843); see Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage; 77 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 827, 834 (1977).
See PCMR, supra note 124, at 63; Note, supra note 172, at 646–647.
See e.g., Comment, supra note 170; at 231–236; Note, Due Process and the Insanity Defense: The Supreme Court’s Retreat from Winship and Mullaney, 54 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 95 (1978); Comment, Oregon’s Partial Responsibility Defense: Disposition of the Defendant and Burden of Proof, 13 WILLAMETTE LAW JOURNAL 347 (1977); BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 399–401.
E.g., BRAKEL and ROCK, id., at 398–399; comment, Mens Rea and Insanity, 28 MAINE LAW REVIEW 500 (1976); State vs. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103,471 P. 2d 715 (1970).
E.g., Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, 230 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 18 (1974); STONE, supra note 78, at 233–228; NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK, 108–113(1978).
Arenella, supra note 173, at 832 fn.25; Note, Insanity — Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 JOHN MARSHALL JOURNAL OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 351, 377–378 (1976); Comment, supra note 170, at 237; Comment, supra note 176, at 522–523; Comment, supra note 175, at 355–356; e.g., Bethea vs. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C.C.A. 1976).
E.g., BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 404–407; Note, supra note 178, at 366–367; MHLP, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Cases: Proposals for Change — Insanity Defense, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 651, 655 (1978); Bolton vs. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen vs. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052 (D.S.D. 1977); Eckerhart vs. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979); State vs. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978).
See e.g., A.L.I., MODEL, PENAL CODE, supra note 134, at §§4.01 and 4.02; Morris, Special Doctrinal Treatment in Criminal Law, in PCMR, supra note 12, at 682, 687 (1976); NEW YORK DEPARTMENT; OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 177, at 9–10; but see Arenella, supra note 173.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969).
Speiser vs. Randall 357 U.S. 513, 525–526 (1958).
E.g., W. LAFAVE and A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, 191–192 (1972).
ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 134, at §2.02(1).
/d,at§§2.02(2)(aHd).
See e.g., MAINE REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED, tit. 17-A, §10 (Supp. 1976); NEW YORK PENAL LAW §15.05 (McKinney 1975). For other terms see Morrissette vs. United States, 342 U.S. 237, 251–252 (1952).
Morrissette vs. United States, id., at 275; State vs. Shaw 106 Ariz. 103,471 P. 2d. 715(1970).
Santamour and West, The Retarded Offender: Problems, Programs, and Prescriptions, m THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 1,14.
Comment, supra note 176, at 505; Note, supra note 175; Leland vs. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Patterson vs. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
See e.g., CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §1026 (1970); MAINE REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED tit. 17-A, §59(1) (Supp. 1976); WISCONSIN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE §971.175 (1971).
Comment, supra note 176.
E.g., State vs. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P. 2d 715 (1970); Hughes vs. Matthews, 440 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
See sources cited supra note 177.
See BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 396–398. Enacting states which nevertheless choose to require an examination of the défendent and which provide the prosecutor with access to the results should provide in addition that: the examining experts be selected from the list published by the Evaluation Oversight Board; the défendent and the prosecution have input into the expert selection process; the examination report contains an opinion on whether the defendant has a developmental disability as defined in this act and if so, an opinion regarding the capacity of the defendant at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed to form the state of mind required for each criminal offense charged and for any lesser included offenses, and the facts and reasons supporting the opinions, as well as the information required by section 15(4)(1) infra; and the procedures and protections offered by section 15 apply including those in section 15(6)(b) relating to the non-admissibility of statements and evidence obtained as a result of the examination on the issue of whether the defendant committed the physical acts required to commit the crime charged.
State vs. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). The Washington statute struck down in Strasburg eliminated the insanity defense but authorized the judge to determine whether accused persons were insane and to commit them to a mental institution. BRAKEL and ROCK, /d, at 378.
Sinclair vs. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1936). The Mississippi statute abolished insanity as a defense for murder, but authorized transfer to a mental institution following conviction. BRAKEL and ROCK, id.
State vs. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929). The Louisiana provision required defendants raising the insanity defense to be tried by a “lunacy commission.” If the commission found the defendant to be insane it could have him or her committed. If the defendant was found to be sane, he or she was referred for trial. BRAKEL and ROCK, id., at 378–379.
See note 82 supra, and the accompanying text.
See e.g., ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7.2 (1973); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE §23–1325 (1973); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEAL §2.5 (2d Ed., Approved Draft 1978).
See sources cited supra note 178.
See Comment, supra note 170, at 227.
See Charts VII and VIII supra; BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 422.
NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 177, at 9 and 113–117.
See Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra; see also MHLP, Legal Issues in State Mental Health CARE: Proposals for Change — Civil Commitment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 77, 83–89 (1977); BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140 at 39–49; Morris, supra note 180, at 686.
These procedures are substantially similar to, but distinct from those contained in the Model Right to Developmental Disabilities Services Act, in Chapter 6, supra; see Comment, supra note 175, at 355–356.
Sansone vs. United States 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
See e.g., Bolton vs. Harris 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Allen vs. Radack 426 F. Supp. 1052 (D.S.D. 1977); State vs. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
See sections 14(3)(b) and 15(1).
BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 404.
Sections 15(4)(a) and (d).
Section 15(4)(d).
See Chart VII supra.
See authorities listed supra note 207.
395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Baxtrom vs. Herold, 383 U.S. 107(1966).
See Davis vs. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Eckerhart vs. Hensley 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
See authorities listed supra, note 207.
Section 3(9).
For a definition of these terms see section 3(1) and the comment thereto.
Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra; see Addington vs. Texas 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969).
MHLP, supra note 204, at 656.
See note 121 and accompanying text.
Cf. section 8 on incompetence to stand trial.
Eckerhart vs. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 914–915 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
See section 3(15) for a definition and discussion of least restrictive alternative.
Morris, supra note 180, at 686; Monahan, supra note 167, at 738–739; Caulfield, Ohio Commitments of the Mentally III Offender, 4 CAPITAL LAW REVIEW 1,22 (1974).
See id.; In re Moye, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 584 P. 2d 1097 (1978); see Chart VII supra.
In keeping with the premise of this act that the procedures for persons with a developmental disability should be comparable to those governing persons without such a disability, enacting jurisdictions which have abolished parole should omit subparagraph (7)(c)(i). See D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975).
Morris, supra note 180, at 686; Monahan, supra note 167, at 538–539.
CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTE ANNOTATED §53a-47 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978); ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES ch. 38, §1005–2–4 (Smith -Hurd 1973 & Supp. 1978); KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED §22–3430 (1974 & Supp. 1978); OREGON REVISED STATUTES §161.341 (1977); AMERICAN SAMOA CODE, tit. 15, §7805 (Cum. Supp. 1978); accord In re Moye, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 584 P. 2d 1047 (1978).
E.g., ABA, supra note 141; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43, at §5.8; ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 134, at §7.09.
See O’Connor vs. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); State vs. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978).
406 U.S. 715, 738(1971).
See Chart VIII supra; see also United States ex rel. Schuster vs. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); State vs. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978).
See section 3(15) and 10(b), (c) and (d).
See section 10(7).
United States ex. rel. Schuster vs. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); State vs. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A. 2d 574 (1978).
See Baxtrom vs. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
See Chart VIII supra.
See section 8(7).
See sections 10(4)–(10).
Section 13.
Cf. NACJJDP, supra note 148, §3.112.
See section 10(10).
Morris, supra note 180, at 684–685.
JUSTICE IN SENTENCING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUITS, 4 (L. Orland and H. Tyler eds. 1974); Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 379, 381 (1979); PCLEAJ, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 14 (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 3.
See e.g., Symposium on Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 1–138, 243–456 (1978–1979); FOGEL, supra note 228; DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (1978); N. MORRIS AND G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIANS GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 213; PCLEAJ, supra note 246.
E.g., ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 134, at §7.07; PCLEAJ, supra note 246, at 18; ABA supra note 141, at §§4.1–4.5; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43, §5.14; Santamour and West supra note 188 at 11; Rowan, Corrections in PCMR, supra note 12, at 649, 674.
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, 205 (Approved Draft 1968); accord ABA, SENTENCING, supra note 141, at 112.
Fernald, The Imbecile with Criminal Instincts, 64 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INSANITY 65 (1909).
See e.g., McGovern, The Incarcerated Retarded Offender: A Conceptual Analysis, ¡n LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER (T. Brelje and W. Craine, eds. 1974); THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12; M. SANTAMOUR and B. WEST, THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER AND CORRECTIONS, 9–11 (1977).
Allen, The Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated in Prison, FEDERAL PROBATION 22, 27 (1978).
Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 243, 254 (1979).
Cf. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 134, at §7.07(1); ABA, SENTENCING, supra note 141, at §18–5.1 (b).
For the procedures applicable to evaluations and the contents of evaluation reports, see section 15.
See section 8(4)(c)(ii).
See section 14(3)(b).
See section 15(4)(a) and (e).
See section 15(4)(e).
See Santamour and West, supra note 188, at 9 and 12; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 44–45; Rowan, supra note 248, at 673.
Haggerty, Kane and Udall, supra note 163; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 5–6; Allen, supra note 252, at 25; McGovern, supra note 251; Plotkin, Stranded in the Jungle: The Mentally Retarded Person in the Criminal Justice System, 1 DISTRICT LAWYER 35 (1977).
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 18; Rowan, supra note 248, at 661; Bicklen, Advocacy for a Nonexceptional Approach, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra, note 12 at 185, 187.
See SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 10; Rowan, supra note 248, at 652 and 666.
B. BROWN and T. COURTLESS, THE MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDER (1971); SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 3–5, 7–8, 16–17; Rowan, supra note 248, at 658–659; 662–664; McGovern, supra note 251.
Richard Allen as quoted in Krause, supra note 30, at 26; see also Haggerty, Kane and Udall supra note 163, at 68; Bicklen, supra note 262, at 187–188; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 9; M. Harris and F. Dunbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment, 7 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 417, 423 (1979).
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 18–20; THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12; Note, supra note 172.
The danger of overreliance on rehabilitation as a correctional objective is illustrated by the following excerpt from the Reaction Comment by Vincent Ziccardi, PCMR, supra note 12, at 687, 688:
For example, I recently walked into a courtroom where one of our attorneys was representing a client at sentencing. The judge was saying to the attorney, “I want to help your client. I think he can be rehabilitated and he should learn a trade. I am going to send him to the state penitentiary for 5 to 15 years.”
The defense attorney jumped up and said, “Judge, this man cannot be rehabilitated. What he needs is punishment. Send him away for 11 Vz to 23 months. He can never learn a trade.”
This scene would be humorous if it did not occur so frequently. Unfortunately, “helping” a defendant, in the eyes of the court, often results in a person’s being sentenced to a very long period of incarceration and seldom results in the provision of constructive services to him.
See N. WEINSTEIN, THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT, 1 (1978).
E.g., MARYLAND ANNOTATED CODE art. 31B, §5 (1971); see BRAKEL and ROCK, supra note 140, at 341–359.
E.g., MARYLAND ANNOTATED CODE art. 31B, §5 (Cum. Supp. 1979); California Penal Code §1170 er reg. (West Supp. 1979); Grindle vs. Miller 400 A.2d 787 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1979); Nebraska vs. Shaw, 277 N.W. 2d. 106 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1979); Rowan, supra note 248; Bicklin, supra note 262; STONE, supra note 78, at 179–198; D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT AND RELEASE (1976); DETERMINATE SENTENCING, supra note 247; Rector and Van Duizend, New Directions for Juvenile Justice, 39 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 347; NACJJDP, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, §§3.181–3.182 (1976). W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS, and D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE (1978).
Rowan, supra note 248, at 668–669.
Id. at 673; see also the other sources listed ¡n note 260 and Haggerty, Kane and Udall, supra note 163 at 68; McGovern, supra note 251; see MHLP, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change -Mental Health Services for Prisoners, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 665, 666–667 (1978).
Newman vs. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 631 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
See e.g., THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 18–23.
PCMR, supra note 124, at 63; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 30; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43, at §2.9, Rowan, supra note 248, at 673; Haywood, Reaction Comment PCMR, supra note 12, at 679–680; cf. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR CORRECTIONS, 30 (Draft 1978); Rouse vs. Cameron 373 F.2d, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cf., ABA COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, Rights Of Disabled Persons In Residential Facilities, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER, 348, 357–359, (1979).
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 35–44.
466 F. Supp. 628, 638.
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251 at 18; Wald, Advocacy For the Mentally Retarded Offender, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 247, 256.
Haywood, supra, note 274, at 679; accord SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251; NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 177; Rowan, supra note 248; but see MHLP, supra note 272.
Katz, The Criminal Reform Movement, in PCMR, supra note 180, at 626, 634; see also Allen, supra note 252 at 27; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251 at 9; e.g., Pugh vs. Locke 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd. sub nom. Newman vs. Alabama, 559 F. 2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
E.g., Newman vs. Alabama, id.; Holt v. Sarver 300 F. Supp. 825, 830–831 (E.D. Ark. 1969); cf. ABA COMMISSION, Residential Facilities, supra note 275, at 354–356.
See section 3(3) for a definition of the term “correctional facility.”
See Rowan, supra note 248, at 673; Schwartz, Reaction Comment, PCMR, supra note 12, at 675–677; Haywood, supra note 274; SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 10–12.
Haywood, supra note 274, at 680; Burgdorf, The Legal Rights of Mentally Retarded Offenders: Some Underlying Issues, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 233, 240–241.
»s 42 U.S.C. §§6001 er seq. (Supp. 1979).
42 U.S.C. §6012 (Supp. 1979); Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra.
Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra; D. SKOLER and A. COHEN, ADVOCACY SYSTEMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED: LEGISLATIVE UNDERPINNINGS (1979).
See authorities cited in notes 265 and 272 supra.
Johnson vs. Avery 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Douglas vs. California 372 U.S. 353(1963).
Haggerty, Kane and Udall, supra note 163.
For a further discussion of the possible role of developmental disabilities advocates in prisons, see MISSOURI ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 56–57; and Gölten, Reaction Comment, PCMR, supra note 12, at 645–648. One possible area of overlap between the developmental disability advocate and an attorney is where the deprivation of services and conditions of confinement are so poor that they constitute cruel and unusual punishment and form the basis of a habeas corpus petition challenging further confinement.
See e.g., M. KANNERSEHN, A REPORT ON THE NEW YORK DIVISION FOR YOUTH OMBUDSMAN PROJECT (1974); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, §§8.3–8.5 (Tentative Draft 1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 459; Tibbies, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N. DAKOTA LAW REVIEW 383 (1972); L. ORLAND, PRISONS HOUSES OF DARKNESS, 155, 207–215 (1975); FOGEL, supra note 228, at 230–236.
See Model Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Act, §5 and 5(11) in Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra; see also 42 U.S.C. §6012 (Supp. 1979).
Model Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Act, in Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra, at §§9(6) and 12.
See §§12(2)(b), (d), and (f); and §§12(3)(b) and (c).
See SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 30; Rowan, supra note 248, at 624.
Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra.
See section 12(1)(c).
See authorities listed supra note 272.
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 10.
/d.,at30.
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 268; Holt vs. Sarver 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970); aff’d 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1Ô71).
FOGEL, supra note 228, at 202; N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Martinson, supra note 253; NACJJDP, supra note 28, at §4.410.
NACJJDP, id., see Rennie vs. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Note, The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and the Involuntarily Committed, 23 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 774 (1974).
Rennie vs. Klein, id. at 1144 and 1145 (1978); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 43, at 45; See MHLP, supra note 272; for a survey of state statutory provisions on the right to refuse treatment, see 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 240 (1977).
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 94TH CONG., 1st SESS., DRUGS IN INSTITUTIONS-Vol. Ill, 339–353; 356–365; 439–447 (1977); DOJ, supra note 275, at 33–34; ABA, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, supra note 292, at §5.8.
But see ABA, id.; DOJ, id., at 33.
For an explanation of the term “designated representative, ” see the comment to section 12(2).
See AAMD, supra note 30, at 25–27; DOJ, supra note 275, at 34.
See e.g., Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980); Sites vs. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W.Va. 1976); Cruz vs. Ward, 424 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.NY. 1976); New York ex rel. Overton vs. Director, Central New York Psychiatric Center, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 254 (App. Div. 1979).
See authorities cited supra note 262 and NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 177, at 115; Ziccardi, supra note 267, at 690.
Wolff vs. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Gagnon vs. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey vs. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980).
ld
Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra. It should be noted that the Vitek decision is ambiguous on the right to counsel in transfer proceedings. Four members of the majority appear to favor the appointment of counsel, but the holding of the case requires only that an inmate receive “qualified and independent assistance.” Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980)
See authorities listed supra note 280.
Sawyer vs. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, 699 (D. Neb. 1970), aff’d 445 F.2d 818 (8th Or. 1971); accord MHLP, supra note 72; but see Tri vento vs. Commissioner of Corrections, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 370 (1978); Bush vs. Ciccone, 325 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
Baxtrom vs. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
SANTAMOUR and WEST, supra note 251, at 9 and 25; MHLP, supra note 272, at 668.
SANTAMOUR and WEST, id.
See sections 5 and 7(1).
See MHLP, supra note 272, at 668–670 and 674.
In keeping with the premise of this act that the procedures for persons with a developmental disability should be comparable to those governing persons without such a disability, enacting jurisdictions which have abolished parole should omit this subsection and all other references to parole in this section. See FOGEL, supra note 228.
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), and Mullane vs. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) regarding notice; Gideon vs. Wain-wright 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and Mempa vs. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) regarding counsel; Lewis vs. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892), and Illinois vs. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) regarding presence; Pointer vs. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) regarding confrontation and cross-examination; Tumey vs. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and Sheppard vs. Maxwell, 389 U.S. 333 (1966), regarding impartial decision-makers.
See also section 10(12).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, 2 (2d ed., Approved Draft 1978).
Id. at §20–1.1 ; NDAA, supra note 45, at §18.2; see United States vs. Di Francesco 79–567, 26 CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 4064 (October 10, 1979).
Mempa vs. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 138 (1967); see e.g., Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas vs. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
See the comments to the sections listed in the text and the authorities cited in the preceding note.
Powell vs. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,36(1967).
See PCMR supra note 124, at 63, 133; THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 13.
See sections 7(2), 8(4)(c), 10(5), 10(10)(c), 11(2), 12(2)(f), and 15(4).
ABA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE — PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, §5–1.4 (2d ed. Approved Draft 1979).
Id. at 7; Chart VI supra.
See Chart II supra; see also Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra.
See comments to sections 8(1) and 8(5)(d).
Psychotropic drugs, also known as antipsychotic drugs include prolixin, thorazine, mellaril, haldol, trilafon, and lithium among others.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
See Griffin vs. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
See sections 4(5), 7(2), 7(3), 8(6), 9(1), 10(7), 10(9), 12(2), 12(3) and 15(5).
Gaylin and Blatte, Behavior Modification in Prisons, 13 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 11 (1975).
Id., at 34–35; see also Chorover, The Pacification of the Brain, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 59 (1974); 43 Fed. Reg. 53242 (1978); ABA LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS, supra note 292, at §5.8; DOJ, supra note 275, at 33.
See sections 7(2), 8(6), 10(7), 11(3), and 12(2); see also section 12(4)(a) regarding the right to refuse services.
See e.g., Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra; Chapter 7: Guardianship and Conservatorship, supra.
See e.g., Chart II.
See Addington vs. Texas 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Cf. Bazelon, supra note 177; NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 177, at 112.
See e.g., Bennett, supra note 69, at 573–574; ROBEY, supra note 71 at 617; STONE, supra note 78, at 202 and 224; Ennis, supra note 71.
See also section 16 on training.
See e.g., Bendt, Balcanoff, and Tragellis, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Is Psychiatry Necessary?, 130 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 11 (1973); MHLP, supra, note 721, at 619.
Sections 5, 8(3), and 10(3).
Chart II, supra.
Chart VI, supra.
See Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra.
Section 13(5).
411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Hawaii 1976).
ABA, supra note 141, at 120–121.
Nebraska Press Association vs. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (Brennan, J. concurring).
Id., at 570.
Cf. section 13(2) and comment thereto.
E.g., sections 4(2), 4(3), 6, 7, 8(4)(c), 8(5)(c), 8(5)(d), 8(9), 8(10), and 10(6).
E.g., sections 5, 8(3), 8(5)(d), 8(5)(e), 10(6)(d) and 11(3).
Richard Van Duizend had primary responsibility for drafting this model statute.
See NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES: COURT STRUCTURE, JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL PERSONNEL, AND JUVENILE RECORDS (1977); NACJJDP, supra note 28, at §§0.111 and 0.121; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 7; PRES-COTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 104, 120 (1909).
E.g., Kent vs. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566 (1966); In re Gault, id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Breed vs. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); for a discussion of current criticisms, changes, and trends in juvenile justice, see Rector and Van Duizend, supra note 270; GAYLIN et al., supra note 270.
Breed vs. Jones, id., at 535.
Norley, Retarded Youth and the Law Enforcement Process, supra note 12; PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67; Morales vs. Tur-man, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev’d on other grounds 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Friel, The Mentally Retarded Offender — Texas CAMIO Research Project, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 95–124.
See sections 6, 10, and 11.
E.g., sections 7 and 9.
For a discussion of the age limits set for juvenile/family court jurisdiction over delinquency, see NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES: JURISDICTION DELINQUENCY, 9–19 (1977).
See section 3(5) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 373, at 2–5.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES JURISDICTION — STATUS OFFENSES, 4–16 (1977).
Chapter 6: Right to Services, supra.
NACJJDP, supra note 148, at 60–61.
See 42 UNITED STATES CODE §5603(12) (1977).
PCLEAJ, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, 10–11 (1967).
W. WEBSTER, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES — 1977, 219 (1978); see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 209.
IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION: INTAKE AND PREDISPOSITION INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES 34–35 (Tentative Draft 1977); NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.142.
PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67.
See comment to sections 7(1) and (4) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act.
See IJA/ABA, PROBATION, supra note 382, at 33–53.
Id., at 47.
PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67.
Donovan, Tfre Juvenile Court and the Mentally Disordered Juvenile, 45 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW 222, 229–232 (1969); PELC. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS (1977) (Unpublished thesis Wellesley College library).
Id.
Donovan, id., at 240–244; Kent vs. United States, 401 F. 2d 408 (D.C. Cir., 1968).
In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La.S.Ct. 1978); also In re S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507 Minn. S.Ct 1979).
See section 8(11) of the Model Developmental Disabled Offenders Act and the comment thereto.
Dusky vs. United States 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Drope vs. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162(1975).
IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, §§3.1(6); 7.1 and 9.3 (Tentative Draft 1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §16.2; NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.134.
For a discussion of other aspects of the operation and meaning of this subsection, see the comment to section 8(1) of the Model Developmental Disabled Offenders Act.
See also the comment to section 8(2) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES: PREADJUDICATION AND ADJUDICATION PROCESSES, 16–21 (1977).
NACJJDP, supra note 148, at comment to §3.151; Martarella vs. Kel-ley, 349 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Donovan, supra note 388, at 228–229.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 397, at 32–40.
But see NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.151; IJA/ABA, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 3, at §4.7; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §12.12.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 397, at 69–88; McKeiver vs. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.134; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28 at §16.3; IJA/ABA, COUNSEL, supra note 3$4, at 81–82.
See in re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 474–475 (La.S.Ct. 1978); and the introduction to this section.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, §14.18.
See section 3(14); cf. 42 UNITED STATES CODE §5602 (Supp. 1979); IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, §2.1 (Tentative DRAFT 1977); NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.182.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 397, at 54–58; but see NACJJDP at §§3.155 and 3.165; IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEDURES, §4.1 (Tentative Draft, 1977).
IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATIONS, 35–36 (Tentative Draft 1977).
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 397, at 64–68; D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY 33 (1974).
395 U.S. 238(1969).
400 U.S. 25(1970).
See In re Appeal No. 544, 25 Md. App. 26, 332 A.2d 680 (1965); G.M.K. vs. State, 312 S.2d 538 (Fla. App. 1975); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Coos County vs. Welch, 501 P.2d 991 (Ore. App. 1972); In re Mary B, 20 Cal. App. 3d 816, 98 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1971).
IJA/ABA, ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 407, at §§3.1–3.7; NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §§3.175–3.177; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §§13.1–13.3.
See BESHAROV, supra note 408, at 311; (pro) IJA/ABA, id., at 35–40; (con) NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.175; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §13.1 ; see also the sources listed supra note 143.
McCarthy, Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency, 10 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM 131, 192–193 (1977).
Mack, supra note 367.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–366 (1969).
Winship, id., at 364, 368.
Fox, Responsibility in Juvenile Court, 11 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW 636 (1970).
Donovan, supra note 388; State of New Jersey in the Interest of H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969) (insanity defense does not apply); In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W. 2d 178 (1966) (insanity defense does apply); In re M.G.S. 72 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968) (insanity defense does apply); In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La.S.Ct. 1978) (insanity defense does apply).
Donovan, supra note 388, at 233.
See section 9(1).
Popkin and Lippert, Is There a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW 421, 426 (1971).
Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW 121, 132(1965).
For an explanation of the diminished capacity and insanity defenses, and of the greater applicability of the concept of diminished capacity to persons with a developmental disability, see the introduction to section 10 of the Model Developmental Disabled Offenders Act and the comment to section 10(2) of that act.
106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969).
See Popkin and Lippert, supra note 422, at 440.
See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
See authority cited supra note 399.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); In re Winship, 358, 365–366 (1969).
Supra note 66.
Supra note 401.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES: JUVENILE DISPOSITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 49 (1977); see also IJA/ ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITION (Tentative Draft 1977);
IJA/ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURES (Tentative Draft 1977); NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §§3.181–3.1813 (1976); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §§14.1–14.15.
Supra note 66.
In re Ralph M., 417 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (N.Y. County Farn. Ct. 1979); see Addington vs. Texas 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67; Donovan, supra note 388 at 246–249.
New York Association for Retarded Children vs. Rockefeller 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
442 U.S. 584(1979).
See In re Ralph M., 417 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (N.Y. County Farn. Ct. 1979).
(delinquency) Morales vs. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 88, 92–93 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev’d on other grounds 535 F. 2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F. 2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Morgan vs. Sproat, 431 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); NACJJDP, supra note 28, at §4.214; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28 at §§23.3 and 24.6 (1976); (developmental disability) ACMRDD, supra note 11 at §1.3; Eckerhart vs. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979); New York State Association for Retarded Citizens vs. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 20 UNITED STATES CODE §1401 (1978) (Education for All Handicapped Children Act); 42 UNITED STATES CODE §6012(b) (Supp. 1979) (Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act).
As of 1976, 41 jurisdictions permit a disposition ordered in a delinquency proceeding to continue until the juvenile is age 21; three set a limit of age 20; three others set the limit at 18; and one uses age 17. NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 432 at 28. It should be noted however, that the limits set forth in paragraph (3)(b) are also compatible with a determinate dispositional system.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, id.
For an explanation of this omission, see the introduction to this section.
Id. and NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO DEVELOP STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCE PREVENTION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 159–160 (1977).
E.g., NACJJDP, supra note 28, at §4.214 and supra note 148, at §3.1812; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, at §14.30.
See in addition to the sources listed supra note 432, Rector and Van Duizend, supra note 270, at 360–361; IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS (Tentative Draft 1977).
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 432, at 3–5.
Id. at 44.
See Section 14 of the Model Developmental Disabled Offenders Act. For the requirements regarding the contents and distribution of the evaluation report, see section 13(4) of this act.
NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.182; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra, note 28 at §14.15; IJA/ABA, DISPOSITIONS, supra note 432, at §2.1; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, CORRECTIONS, supra note 43, at 575.
See Dennis, Mental Retardation and Corrections: A Research Perspective, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS AND THE LAW, supra note 12, at 34, 38, 48; Wald, supra note 278, at 248–249; Friel, supra note 370, at 107, 109–119; Morales vs. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 43 (ED. Tex. 1974), rev’d on other grounds 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977), remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
WEINSTEIN, supra note 268.
See e.g., State of New Jersey in the Interest of H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969); MISSISSIPPI YOUTH COURT ACT, §73 (1978). 4« Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980).
Fain vs. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1973).
442 U.S. 584(1979).
See PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra note 67.
See also section 10(6)(d) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act and the comment thereto.
See authorities cited in note 440 supra.
See e.g., Nelson vs. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Indiana 1972), aff’d 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) cert, denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Mar-tarella vs. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Morales vs. Turman, 383 F. Supp 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) rev’d on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded 430 U.S. 322 (1977) remanded for further hearings 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
In addition to the sources cited in note 459, supra, see Rector and Van Duizend, supra note 270; NACJJDP, supra, note 28, at §§4.21–4.82; IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION (Tentative Draft 1977); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra, note 28, at §§23.1–24.16.
See PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra, note 67 and the authorities cited in note 450.
Nelson vs. Heyne, 491 F.2d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 1976); See also Pugh vs. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d sub. nom. Newman vs. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
See authorities cited supra, note 439.
See e.g., L ARTHUR and W. GAUGER, DISPOSITION HEARINGS: HEARTBEAT OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1974).
See NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.189 and the comment thereto.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, supra note 440.
Cf. Model Developmental Disabled Offenders Act, §12(2).
Cf. IJA/ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, 113 (Tentative Draft 1977); NACJJDP, supra, note 148, at §3.134; NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS, BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES THE COURTS, AND THE LAW, 148 (R. Sarri and Y. Hasenfeld, eds. 1975).
See also IJA/ABA, CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 460, at 86–94; NACJJDP, supra note 28, at §4.410.
IJA/ABA, id.
Parham vs. J. L. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980).
PRESCOTT and VAN HOUTEN, supra, note 67 at 19; Friel, supra note 370, at 111–112.
442 U.S. 584(1979).
For a further discussion of the basis and intent of this provision, see the comment to section 12(5) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act. See also the Model Right to Services Admission to Services Act, supra, note 66.
See Sections 9(8) and 10(3) of this act; see also Baxtrom vs. Herold, 383 U.S. 107(1966).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See sections 7(4) and (8); 9(6) and (10): 10(3) and 11(5). For a discussion of the importance of the right to appeal in delinquency, see In re Gault, id., at.
See NACJJDP, supra note 148 at §3.133; see also IJA/ABA, DISPOSITIONAL PROCEDURE, note 432, at §3.1.
For a discussion of the limitation on prosecutorial appeals, see the comment to section 13(1) of the Model Developmentally Disabled Offenders Act.
On the need for appointed counsel in delinquency and disability proceedings, see In re GAULT, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); NACJJDP, supra note 148, at §3.132; IJA-ABA, COUNSEL, supra note 394, at §§2.3–2.4; Vitek vs. Jones, U.S. (1980) (opinion of White J. for the court) but see Vitek vs. Jones, id., at (Powell, J. concurring).
See sections 7(6), 9(7), and 11(2).
See authorities cited supra note 401.
See section 14 of the Model Developmental Disabled Offfenders Act and the comment thereto.
Enacting jurisdictions which reduce the maximum period for delay because of a finding of incompetence to assist counsel, should modify paragraph (4)(c) accordingly.
NATIONAL TASK FORCE, COURT STRUCTURE, supra note 366, at 51, see also NACJJDP, supra note 28 §§0.53 and 0.532; IJA-ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE RECORDS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (Tentative Draft 1977).
387 U.S. 1, 47(1967).
E.g., sections 6, 7(4)(c), 7(5)(c), 7(5)(d), 7(9), 7(10), and 9(6).
E.g., sections 7(3), 7(5)(d), 7(5)(e), 9(6)(f), and 10(3).
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Sales, B.D., Powell, D.M., Duizend, R.V. (1982). Criminal and Juvenile Justice. In: Disabled Persons and the Law. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0794-6_16
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