Criminal and Juvenile Justice

  • Bruce Dennis Sales
  • D. Matthew Powell
  • Richard Van Duizend

Abstract

The substantive criminal law states rules of conduct and prescribes sanctions — usually a range of sanctions — for violation of these rules.

Keywords

Supra Note Developmental Disability Program Plan Juvenile Justice Juvenile Offender 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Dennis Sales
    • 1
  • D. Matthew Powell
    • 1
  • Richard Van Duizend
    • 1
  1. 1.Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project of the American Bar Association’sCommission on the Mentally DisabledUSA

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