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Banks are not Special: The Federal Safety Net and Banking Powers

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Governing Banking’s Future: Markets vs. Regulation

Part of the book series: Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions ((IFMI))

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate reconsideration of fundamental principles in the debate on the restructuring of the financial services industry. Four underlying propositions are defended:

  1. 1.

    Public moneys should not be used to subsidize the risk-taking activities of depository institutions.

  2. 2.

    The lender of last resort should confine its activities to lending to support the short-term liquidity needs of depository institutions and should not engage in equity investment or capital replacement for banks or thrift institutions.

  3. 3.

    The deposit insurance laws should be strictly construed to reduce moral hazard and to avoid favoring one class of institutions or claimants over other classes.

  4. 4.

    The central bank should neither monetize the Treasury’s deficits nor make payments that either would not be made or would be made by the Treasury if the central bank did not make them.

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Authors

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Catherine England

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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Todd, W.F. (1991). Banks are not Special: The Federal Safety Net and Banking Powers. In: England, C. (eds) Governing Banking’s Future: Markets vs. Regulation. Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6714-7_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6714-7_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-6716-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-6714-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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