Abstract
This article is a brief, subjective guided tour into an area of active, recent work in political science—patial models of voting. We will be concerned with two main questions. The first is how we can measure the power of voters in an asymmetric voting situation. The second is how we can predict or judge the outcome of a voting situation.
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Straffin, P.D. (1989). Spatial Models of Power and Voting Outcomes. In: Roberts, F. (eds) Applications of Combinatorics and Graph Theory to the Biological and Social Sciences. The IMA Volumes in Mathematics and Its Applications, vol 17. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6381-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6381-1_14
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