Abstract
The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) revealed that to have nuclear safety there must not only be reliable equipment, but there must also be competent and qualified people. At TMI there were equipment malfunctions, but the vital safety equipment performed well. An accident with serious core damage and radioactive release occurred only because operators mistakenly stopped the flow of emergency cooling water. Health effects from radiation exposure were negligible. Continued loss of flow of emergency cooling water would have led to core melting, but the containment would have survived and protected the public. Serious fright and trauma resulted from technical errors and public announcements of these errors a few days after the accident. Earlier experience from other reactors and analyses dating back to 1972 should have alerted the industry, the regulatory agency, and the operators and avoided the accident. This experience from the Three Mile Island accident provides many valuable lessons in the management of nuclear safety. Several such lessons revealed from the investigation by the President’s Commission are discussed here.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
J. G. Kemeny, G. Babbitt, P. E. Haggerty, C. Lewis, P. A. Marks, C. B. Marrett, L. McBridge, H. C. McPherson, R. W. Peterson, T. H. Pigford, T. B. Taylor, A. D. Trunk: “The Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island” (1979).
K. H. Ardon and D. G. Cain: “TMI-2 core Heat-up Analysis,” NSAC-24 (1980).
W. R. Stratton et al.: “Staff Reports to the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: Reports of the Technical Assessment Task Force, Vol. II” (1979).
J. J. DiNunno, F. D. Anderson, R. E. Baker, R. L. Waterfield: “Calculations of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites,” TID-14844, U.S. AEC (1962).
N. Rasmussen et al.: “Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,” WASH 1400 (1975).
U.S. Federal Register, 10 CFR 100.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 University of Tokyo Press
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pigford, T.H. (1981). The Management of Nuclear Safety: Lessons Learned from the Accident at Three Mile Island. In: Oshima, K., Mishima, Y., Ando, Y. (eds) Nuclear Engineering for an Uncertain Future. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-4184-0_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-4184-0_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-4186-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-4184-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive