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Directions in Large-Scale Systems pp 149–185Cite as

Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations

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Abstract

Many organizational decision problems may be usefully modeled as the programming problem:

$${\text{P}}:\,\,\,\,\mathop {{\text{Max}}}\limits_{\text{x}} {\text{F}}\left( {\text{x}} \right)$$
((1.1))

subject to G(x) ≤ 0 where x ∈ ℝN, F: ℝN→ℝ, and G : ℝN→ℝK.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Northwestern University, USA

    Theodore Groves

Authors
  1. Theodore Groves
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

    Y. C. Ho

  2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

    S. K. Mitter

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© 1976 Plenum Press, New York

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Groves, T. (1976). Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations. In: Ho, Y.C., Mitter, S.K. (eds) Directions in Large-Scale Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-2261-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-2259-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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