Abstract
Attribution theory concerns the processes that the average individual uses in attempting to infer the causes of observed behavior. The data generated by the theory are beginning to give important insights into these processes. Attribution theory assumes a conception of causality, yet philosophy should warn us that the concept of causality is a cornerstone set in quicksand. Our major thesis is that to use the concept of physical causation as a cornerstone on which to build an understanding of human behavior is to use what is “out there” to understand what is “in here.” Our only possible understanding of what is out there (physical causation) is in terms of what is in here (our feelings of personal causation). Therefore, attribution of causality must start in here and the study of it should start by more carefully analyzing the aspects of phenomenal causality. Such an analysis of the conceptual framework that we bring to the study of persons in action suggests (a) that some of our research efforts are attempts to demonstrate nonempirical propositions, i.e., relationships that are logically implied in our premises, and (b)that a step beyond present-day attribution theory to the question “what is entailed by a concept of man as a personal cause?” may point the way to more cumulative and practically useful empirical research.
The preparation of this paper was facilitated by an NIMH grant (MH 22127–02). The research reported was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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deCharms, R., Shea, D.J. (1976). Beyond Attribution Theory. In: Strickland, L.H., Aboud, F.E., Gergen, K.J. (eds) Social Psychology in Transition. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-8765-1_22
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