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Tennessen and the Problem of Conceptual Schemes

  • James Robert Brown
Chapter
  • 86 Downloads
Part of the Annals of Theoretical Psychology book series (AOTP, volume 4)

Abstract

After surveying some of the interesting aspects of perception, Tennessen argues that we “seem to need something like a world view, a global conceptual scheme, a conceptual frame of reference.” There is, Tennessen quite rightly claims, no such thing as a neutral given. The belief that there could be something prior to any theory, a pristine “testimony of the senses,” is nothing more than a myth; we can see only from some “point of view” or other.

Keywords

World View Conceptual Scheme Paradoxical Consequence Conceptual Frame Scientific Research Programme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Davidson, D. (1974). The very idea of a conceptual scheme. Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 47, 5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: New Left Books.Google Scholar
  3. Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  4. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsifiability and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. E. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91–96). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Robert Brown
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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