Tennessen and the Problem of Conceptual Schemes
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After surveying some of the interesting aspects of perception, Tennessen argues that we “seem to need something like a world view, a global conceptual scheme, a conceptual frame of reference.” There is, Tennessen quite rightly claims, no such thing as a neutral given. The belief that there could be something prior to any theory, a pristine “testimony of the senses,” is nothing more than a myth; we can see only from some “point of view” or other.
KeywordsWorld View Conceptual Scheme Paradoxical Consequence Conceptual Frame Scientific Research Programme
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